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§ INTRODUCTION § 
Living Standards: 
The Neglected Dimension 
 
 
In 2012, Genworth, a leading Australian credit underwriter and provider of mortgage 
insurance, released ‘Streets Ahead’, its latest report on homebuyer confidence in 
Australia. ‘Streets Ahead’ detailed that “a general rise in the cost of living” was the 
major factor underpinning mortgage stress levels in Australia (Genworth, 2012: 8).  
Another report by the Fujitsu ratings agency in 2010, also identified that cost of living 
was the major source of mortgage stress (Fujitsu, 2010: 29).  
Such private indicators are far from conclusive, and indeed organizations such as 
Genworth and Fujitsu (as profit seekers and rentiers) have their own agendas. 
However, their information on the perceived rise in the cost of living, signifies that 
something is at odds with the ‘never had it so good’ narrative surrounding living 
standards in Australia; a narrative that has come to define the conventional political 
discourse. The discrepancy between these two narratives manifests in more informal 
ways, such as popular concerns surrounding the implementation of the carbon tax, or 
public opposition to programs of privatisation based on cost of living concerns. 
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How can it be that Australians have ‘never had it so good’ when there exists this 
popular perception that increasing living costs are a major constraint? 
The conventional narrative describing Australian prosperity over the past 40 years 
depicts a household characterised by expanding consumption capacity, and new 
opportunities for participation. In 2011 (and in response to the emergence of ‘Occupy 
Sydney’), commentator Scott Steel wrote, that Australians are in a “state of denial” as 
to “the reality of our privileged circumstances” (2011). Steel’s point was that, over the 
past 40 years, all Australians have got richer due to a policy program that has 
“actually solved most of the big problems that other nations are still grappling with” 
(2011). Similarly, the latest AMP.NATSEM report stated that, in comparison to 1984, 
the average Australian family is $224/week ahead, with the benefits spreading to both 
high and low income families (Phillips, et. al., 2012). Moreover, this ‘never had it so 
good’ narrative is one endorsed and espoused by prominent public institutions that 
account for household standard of living in Australia: notably the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (ABS) and the Australian Treasury.  
Certainly, a narrative of increasingly accessible consumer durables, of increasing 
levels of wealth, and of household participation in previously excluded activities is 
not inaccurate. However, the narrative neglects a critical dimension of the story. A 
dimension that, as indicated by the Genworth and Fujitsu reports, households 
themselves have not failed to perceive.  
This dimension is not inequality, although this is an important complimentary area of 
concern. Nor is my explanation located in ideas, such as those of commentator Clive 
Hamilton, who attribute this apparent paradox to greed, individualism and a growing 
sense of entitlement. Other scholars, such as Sharon Beder (2000) or Gary Cross 
(1993) have discussed the time pressures and money stresses associated with the 
consumption and production requirements of ‘modern’ capitalism. However, I am 
concerned with a different material factor underlying such pressures – a factor 
separate from debates about greed, consumption and happiness.  
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The critical factor I identify as missing from the ‘never had it so good’ narrative is the 
process of financialisation. More specifically, I am concerned with the transfer of 
financial risk and the way this is impacting negatively on households, in ways not 
acknowledged in the conventional cost of living measures.  
The proposition I develop in this thesis is that, in Australia over the past 40 years, 
there has been a structural shift that has systematically integrated households into 
financial activities. This structural shift has transferred onto households the financial 
risks associated with accessing subsistence items such as housing, health, education 
and an income. I show that household risks are distinct – that they cannot be priced 
and traded as conceived in the idealised theories of finance – and that this is 
particularly the case for working class households, which, as defined by their limited 
ownership or control over assets, are constricted in their ability to engage with 
financial risk. The distinctive nature of household risk entails particular costs; costs 
that are inadequately incorporated into conventional measures of living standards.  
The inadequate account of the costs associated with household risk reflects the 
conceptual challenge posed by the changing and increasingly financialised household. 
When, for example, the 1907 Harvester Judgement determined an ‘adequate’ living 
wage, there was no expectation that households would have to negotiate the risks 
associated with financial markets. Now, however, households are increasingly cast as 
financially literate investors, capable of navigating complex financial markets and risk 
exposures in their daily functioning. In today’s context, a failure to transcend ‘pre-
financialised’ conceptions of living standards therefore results in an inability to 
identify the other side of the ‘never had it so good’ coin. 
Accordingly, I have structured this thesis to: firstly, explore the costs incurred by the 
Australian household, particularly the working class household, in the transfer of 
financial risk; and, secondly, identify the reasons for the neglect of such costs from 
the standard ‘never had it so good’ narrative. In chapter 1, I develop – both 
conceptually and empirically – an account of the costs absorbed by households 
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through risk shifting processes. I also consider the particular implications of these 
processes for the living standards of the ‘financially illiquid’ working class household. 
In chapter 2, I turn to explorations of the politics of measurement, focusing my 
discussion on the ABS’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) and, in chapter 3, the Treasury’s 
Wellbeing Framework (TWF), as politically significant examples of such 
measurements and frameworks. The CPI’s and TWF’s differing treatments of the 
financialised household are of critical import. They exemplify a state of affairs 
whereby working class households are increasingly drawn into more and more 
processes of risky financial calculation, yet in a way that systematically conceals the 
costs absorbed through these very processes.  
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Locating my Perspective 
 
The failure to adequately conceptualise of financialisation as a structural shift of risk 
onto working class households, is a critical factor behind the neglect to account for the 
financial costs absorbed by households in recent decades. While it may be far from 
controversial to claim that we live in a world that has seen the mass expansion of 
financial motives – “every man (women and child) is now a speculator” (Fraser, 2006: 
1) – the actual term financialisation has no universal meaning. There is a tendency to 
characterise recent transformations either in terms of the structural changes affecting 
household income and expenditure, or in terms of individuals engaging in more and 
more risky activities, thus neglecting the other corresponding (and critical) dimension. 
Significant contributions by Marxian and other radical scholars outline structural 
‘neoliberal’ or ‘financial’ changes in the Australian economy, and the impact that 
such changes have had on the Australian household (see, for example, Stilwell & 
Jordan, 2007; Cahill et. al., 2012; Anderson 1999; Cahill, 2005 and Chester, 2012). 
Policy doctrines of deregulation and privatisation have led to changing patterns of 
household provisioning, whereby engagement with private markets is increasingly 
necessary in order to access subsistence items. These policy doctrines have also 
resulted in working conditions that are less and less tied to cost of living adjustments, 
and thus decreasingly protected from the dictate of private capital.  
These structural accounts of neoliberal changes have raised critical concerns 
surrounding the market imperatives imposed in work, social and domestic life. 
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However, such narratives can be complemented by a direct exploration of the transfer 
of risks implied in the neoliberal turn.  
Conversely, Marxist economists such as Costas Lapavitsas, Ben Fine or Paulo dos 
Santos have highlighted the financial aspects of such neoliberal processes, affording 
particular attention to the increasing levels of household debt. Dos Santos writes that 
changes in the banking sector have “forced individuals into debt and necessitated the 
transfer of growing shares of their income” (2009: 192). Such concern with household 
debt is far from confined to Marxist scholars, as reflected by publications from the 
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), which focuses on the implications of what 
constitutes a ‘sustainable’ level of household indebtedness (Kent et. al. 2007: 146). 
Similarly, post-Keynesian Steve Keen focuses on the impact of levels of private debt 
on the stability of the economy (2009: 347). These debt-focussed accounts have a 
popular and intuitive appeal in the context of a very high percentage of household 
debt in relation to disposable income in Australia – which rose from 40% in the 1970s 
to over 150% in 2011 (Freestone et. al., 2011: 64). This appeal has only grown since 
the ‘bursting’ of the subprime mortgage bubble in the United States.  
These studies open up critical connections between neoliberalism and finance. 
However, the scope of inquiry of these studies is restricted to the concrete and 
(relatively) straightforward-to-measure changes in price or income levels, and in 
particular, to the causes and consequences of household debt. These scholars do not 
develop a systematic analysis of the kind I am about to undertake: an analysis of the 
broader and more diverse costs associated with the underlying transfer of financial 
risk.  
Risk is an aspect that is far from neglected in other areas of study. Indeed, a wealth of 
literature has emerged in recent years, dedicated to unpackaging the increasing 
pervasiveness of risk in daily life. This literature has come from across the political 
spectrum, including the economic mainstream. 
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Risk is hardly a new concept for neoclassical economists. In 1951, notable economist 
Kenneth Arrow wrote of the: 
… intrinsic uncertainty in possible outcomes… [and] the importance of a 
realistic theory explaining how individuals choose among alternate courses of 
action when the consequences of their actions are incompletely known to them 
(1951: 404, quoted in Banerjee and Ewing, 2004: 22).  
More recently, economists such as Robert Shiller (2003) and Joseph Stiglitz (2009) 
have, in their differing ways, concretely applied Arrow’s insights to examine the risk-
exposed household. Importantly, both these theorists have acknowledged the 
difficulties that risk poses for households – a consequence of incomplete risk markets 
or behavioural irrationalities. Such difficulties result in the “failure to bring the 
advantages [of risk trading] shared by the clients of Wall St to the customers of Wall 
Mart” (Shiller, 2003: 1).  
These orthodox accounts have a common strength in identifying the prominence and 
pervasiveness of risk in contemporary capitalism. However, these perspectives largely 
fail to locate such ubiquitous risk within the significant structural changes identified 
by the ‘neoliberalism’ literature. The lens for viewing increasing risk-exposure is in 
terms of the preferences and choices of individuals, abstracted from the changing 
patterns of expenditure of the state and employers that have underpinned household 
engagement with financial activities. 
Scholars from other theoretical traditions have therefore located the risk-exposed 
individual or household within broader social changes. In 1992, Ulrich Beck wrote 
Risk Society: towards a new modernity, asserting that modern capitalism has shifted 
from an industrial to a risk society, whereby “individuals reflect upon and flexibly 
restructure the rules and resources of the workplace and of their leisure time” (1992: 
3). That is, an ‘individualised’ society has developed that both affords individuals new 
opportunities for self-development, but also results in these individuals absorbing 
increasing levels of risk. Notably, however, and perhaps reflective of the era in which 
he wrote, Beck made no substantial reference to financial risk.  
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Beck’s thesis nonetheless inspired a wave of particularly post-structuralist 
engagement with financial risk. For example, Paul Langley explores the new 
relationship that individuals and households have formed with capital markets, 
whereby risk is constructed as an opportunity to be embraced, but with the potential of 
damaging outcomes:  
While many individuals and households undoubtedly gain from recently 
formed relationships with the capital markets, the material effects of these 
relationships are also highly divisive and, at points of crisis in particular, can 
be disastrous for those involved (2008: 14). 
Similarly, sociologist Leonard Seabrooke outlines the way that individuals, through 
access to finance or credit, have become embedded in cumulative financial processes, 
and the negative implications this may have, particularly for those in lower income 
groupings (2006).  
Jacob Hacker’s comprehensive book The Great Risk Shift locates the pervasiveness of 
household risk in the pursuit of a particular policy framework, driven by a “personal 
responsibility crusade” (2006: 9). Hacker describes the transfer of what was 
previously socially dispersed risk onto individual household units, stating that: “work, 
family and public and private benefits have all grown more risky at roughly the same 
time” (2006: 5). A similar perspective has been developed by Elizabeth Warren1 who 
discusses the requirement for families to engage in financial activities such as 
unaffordable credit or complicated loans “to keep safe… and let them earn a living” 
(2006: 14).  
Yet even these more holistic accounts, with their differing emphasis, afford no scope 
for accounting for financialisation as a process of risk shifting inextricably linked to 
capitalist class relations, as identified by Bryan et. al. (2009: 120). In chapter 1, I 
return to the centrality of class, and not just as a distributional category but because of 
labour’s innate illiquidity in financial markets. But the implication here is that even 
theorists such as Hacker, who directly link increasing levels of risk to changing policy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Elizabeth Warren implemented the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) then headed consumer 
protection inside the Federal Reserve in the immediate aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis.  
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frameworks, conceive of risk as a pervasive characteristic that households are no 
longer protected against, rather than as a cost that has been systematically transferred 
onto households, and onto working class households in particular. This conception 
means that while Hacker, Warren or Seabrooke may offer comprehensive engagement 
with the shifting of risk, there is a layer to the financial dimension of risk shifting that 
is left unaddressed: risk is not taken into account in the quantified measures of 
household living standards. I identify this failure to quantify the costs of financial 
risk, as a critical factor in the apparent paradox between data supporting the ‘never 
had it so good’ narrative, and perceptions surrounding increased living costs in 
Australia.  
I am therefore concerned in this thesis with demonstrating the limitations of 
conventional institutions that are responsible for measuring and accounting for living 
standards in Australia. Specifically, I am concerned with the limitations of these 
institutions to quantify the costs of the financial shift of risk onto households, and in 
particular working class households. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
THE RISK-EXPOSED 
AUSTRALIAN HOUSEHOLD 
 
Over the past 40 years, changing expenditure patterns by the state and employers have 
required households to manage an increasing array of financial transactions and risk 
exposures. Households have had to engage with these transactions and risk exposures 
in order to maintain access to subsistence items. In this chapter, I outline the 
importance of incorporating the costs associated with such risk exposure into the way 
that we account for living standards in Australia, particularly for working class 
households.  
There are two critical dimensions to consider when addressing the issue of household 
risk: (i) the risk return of capital investment; and, (ii) the financial illiquidity of 
households.  
Firstly, accounting for the costs associated with household risk can be conceptualised 
as akin to capital investment. It is undisputed that capital investment involves 
exposure to varying degrees of risk, and that such exposure represents a cost above 
and beyond the cost of an underlying asset. My argument here is simple – apply a risk 
return calculus to the risk-exposed household.  
 16 
However, this argument for applying the risk return calculus to households only goes 
so far. The argument neglects the second dimension relating to the specific character 
of household risk, and in particular working class household risk: namely, illiquidity. 
Such illiquidity means that – in the context of structural changes to the financial 
architecture – households have had little option other than to engage with increasing 
levels of financial risk, and that such pervasive risk and insecurity cannot be readily 
hedged. The risk absorbed by households, and working class households in particular, 
therefore entails particular costs beyond those of, and thus requiring different 
treatment to, risk-exposed capital.  
I have structured sections 1.1 and 1.2 of this chapter to explain these two dimensions, 
and thus my conceptual argument of the costs absorbed by the financialised 
household. I then, in section 1.3, offer empirical evidence to support this conceptual 
argument. Developing such an account of the costs associated with household risks is 
critical, as is exemplified when I consider, in chapters 2 and 3, the prominent ways in 
which living standards are measured and addressed in Australia.  
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1.1 The Cost of Financial Risk 
 
It is an undisputed assertion that, in relation to firms or governments, exposure to 
financial risk entails a cost. Since the development of the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) in the 1950s, it has been well established in financial literature that 
governments and firms face significant levels of exposure when investing: “risk is at 
the centre of all investment decisions” (Bernstein, 2007: 4; see also Reinsdorf, 2011: 
7; Arrow, 1951). This exposure to financial risk (of varying degrees), represents a cost 
above and beyond the costs of an underlying asset. Frameworks for valuing 
investment must therefore account for risk exposure, which orthodox economists do 
by utilising the risk-adjusted measurement ‘alpha’ in their equilibrium models.  
My point here is not to affirm the accuracy of CAPM model for pricing an individual 
security or portfolio. In spite of its wide application, CAPM faces significant 
conceptual criticism both within and between disciplines, with theories on how to 
calculate and convert the value of risk being heavily contested. For example, theorists 
within the mainstream ‘search for alpha’; post-Keynesians contend that market 
uncertainty means that alpha cannot be determined; while Marxists debate the 
material basis of risk’s underlying value. My point is rather that, when it comes to 
investing, it is undisputed that risk exposure represents a significant cost that requires 
some form of risk-return calculation.  
The pervasive risks to which people are increasingly exposed in their home and 
working lives (as I empirically outline in section 1.3) represent a cost just like the 
‘alpha’ factored in a firm’s or a government’s investment decision. That is, 
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households now face the prospect of incurring costs above and beyond the direct costs 
observed in changing price, debt or income levels. Such underlying costs may be 
difficult to conceptualise or quantify. Furthermore (as I outline in section 1.2), these 
costs are distinct from those facing firms. However, the existence of such costs, a 
point so established in relation to capital, should not be denied.  
Yet there exists an anomaly, whereby the importance of applying a risk-return 
calculation for household financial activity continues to fall off the analytical radar. In 
chapter 2, I explore the practical consequences of this anomaly, by examining the 
Consumer Price Index’s conceptual treatment and attempted incorporation of various 
aspects of household finance. I examine its ability to account for both concrete price 
changes of financial items, and also the implicit costs – the household ‘alpha’ – of 
risky financial exposure. Here we see some of the issues that I have identified in the 
previous paragraphs come to a head. 
Overcoming anomaly? 
As issues of pervasive risk become increasingly central to the depiction of 
households, the neglect of household risk exposure has not gone unnoticed, not least 
of all within orthodox economics. Economists such as Shiller and Stiglitz have, in 
their different ways, concretely applied some of the neoclassical treatment of capital 
risk to the risk-exposed household. Their work is particularly significant because of its 
influence on the treatment of household finance within parts of the political 
mainstream, including the Australian Treasury. Stiglitz and Shiller expand on the 
orthodox treatment of finance as represented by Kenneth Arrow (1951; see also 
Edward Bernstein, 2007). Arrow explained not only the intrinsic uncertainty in almost 
every investment decision, but also the difficulties of trading in risk, where 
information problems, contractual problems and externalities result in incomplete risk 
markets (Arrow in Banerjee & Ewing, 2004: 26). 
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Both Shiller and Stiglitz explore the risks that households now decide to expose 
themselves to, and the difficulties that households face through such exposure. That 
is, distorted market conditions preclude individuals from realising their optimal risk 
preferences; from “ascertaining the precariousness associated with various lending 
provisions as well as the steps that can be taken to offset such precariousness” 
(Stiglitz, 2009). They identify three particular difficulties that can arise: (i) households 
may be restricted or unable to access important risk markets to offset and manage 
their exposure; (ii) irrationality may lead individuals to engage in activities and 
undertake decisions that undermine their own interests (a point informed by the 
significant growth in behavioural economics over recent years, see for example 
Barbaris & Thaler, 2002: 2); and, (iii) there may exist particular products that are 
excessively uncertain and volatile.  
Shiller and Stiglitz therefore identify particular difficulties that households face as a 
result of increased risk exposure. They advocate policies to address these difficulties, 
such as the development of insurance markets for house prices or income, programs 
for financial literacy or regulation of particular products (Stiglitz, 2009). Together 
they apply some of the implications of orthodox economics to the risk-exposed 
household, supporting a policy framework that allows individual households to better 
manage their risk exposures, just like capital.  
However, and in so doing, both scholars neglect to account for the actual costs 
associated with such risk levels, and fail to consider the specific character of 
household risk, and in particular working class household risk. I consider the issue of 
actual costs in the next section. 
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1.2 The costs for working class households 
 
For the average working class Australian household, engagement with finance is 
dictated by a need to access subsistence items such as housing, healthcare and income. 
This dictated engagement does not preclude instances where households may decide, 
for example, to invest savings in a particular financial market. However, there remains 
a fundamental difference between a working class household investing in a pension 
fund or health insurance scheme, and the choice of a firm – or indeed a household 
with surplus assets – to invest in a share or equity market.  
The distinct character of working class household risk is due to its financial 
illiquidity.  
Conventional financial theory assumes that assets are liquid for the individual holder. 
However, the major assets owned or controlled by working class households are (i) 
the ability to work, and (for some) (ii) housing. Both these items are integral to daily 
functioning. Given a limited range of alternative acquisitions able to sustain 
subsistence, these assets cannot be readily sold without threatening subsistence and 
are therefore – to quote orthodox economist John Campbell – “illiquid and 
untradeable” (2006: 1559).2 The ability to work (or ‘human capital’) entails the 
receiving of an income but not the ability to sell claims on that income, making it 
“idiosyncratic in practise… and [therefore] unhedgeable” (2006: 1559). That is, 
working class reliance on a wage for subsistence purposes differentiates, and places 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Campbell, however, does not frame illiquidity in terms of class, rather stating that all households are 
defined by a limited ownership or control over assets (2006: 1558).   
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limitations on, ‘the ability to work’ in comparison to other tradeable assets. Housing is 
illiquid in the sense that there is little scope for individuals to shift their investment in 
housing in response to, or in anticipation of, changes in the economic landscape. 
Working class households, who purchase housing primarily as a place to live, are 
disinclined to treat their home as an asset to be bought and sold in response to short-
term price movements in real estate prices. Furthermore, the high costs of selling, and 
long settlement periods, define this market as illiquid irrespective of the intentions of 
the house owner.  
In engaging with finance, working class households are therefore in an inherently 
different position from those firms, governments or wealthier households that have 
control or ownership over a significant portfolio of assets. For example, significant 
wealth may result in the need to work being optional, or ownership of multiple houses 
often means that any one of them can be relatively liquid. This distinctiveness of 
working class households has two critical implications given the structural changes 
that have transferred financial risk from the state and corporate sector onto households 
(see section 1.3).  
Firstly, financial illiquidity underscores the lack of choice or agency that working 
class households have in individually absorbing what were previously often socially 
dispersed risks. Such households, not controlling alternative forms of wealth, cannot 
‘opt-out’ of engaging with the risks of financial markets whilst maintaining access to 
subsistence items. For example, when accessing higher education, working class 
households generally have little ‘choice’ whether or not to participate in the Higher 
Education Contribution Scheme (HECS),3 while those with an expanded asset 
portfolio may be able to pay the up-front fees. Simultaneously, working class 
households are forced to take on particular risks and the potential financial and non-
financial costs that such risks entail. For example, if the costs associated with 
comprehensive car insurance or dental check-ups (and to a lesser, but nevertheless 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Reforms to HECS in 2005/06 renamed the scheme HECS-HELP (Higher Education Loan Provision), 
which retains the same principles as HECS. See the Australian Government’s ‘Study Assist’ website 
for further clarification: http://studyassist.gov.au/sites/StudyAssist/. 
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increasing, degree income insurance) are too high; households take on the risks 
associated with not having the protection provided through such coverage.  
Secondly, financial illiquidity restrains the ability of households, once engaged with 
finance, to adequately manage their risk. Working class households are heavily 
constrained in their capacity to on-sell or hedge their financial exposure, through, for 
example, the diversification of assets, let alone to expand their asset portfolios 
through speculation. By the same token, such limited resources mean that working 
class households are far more susceptible, particularly when exposed to volatility, to 
becoming “locked in” via credit and insurance markets to reinforcing cycles of risk 
and debt (Bryan et. al., 2009: 470). For example, they are far more constrained than 
firms in their ability to hedge against changes in interest rate markets, and rapid 
changes may force them to turn to other credit sources to cover unexpected costs.  
The critical point is that a narrative of working class risk exposure, or an application 
of a household risk-return calculus, must account for the limited ability to avoid or 
reduce such pervasive levels of risk. This is something that is pervasively neglected in 
existing literature.  
Orthodoxy hits a wall 
When orthodox economists consider households in their theories of financial 
calculation, they incorporate households into a discourse of individualism, markets 
and efficiency, conceiving of all household risk akin to that of a firm or government. 
This discourse dissolves the category of class. The financial significance of differing 
levels of asset ownership is discounted, with risk only receiving treatment to the 
extent that it facilitates or fails to facilitate the ability of individuals to optimally 
utilise risk markets. Economists such as Shiller and Stiglitz therefore remain 
constrained to a discourse that cannot incorporate factors that are not reducible to 
particular market or behavioural distortions. There is no scope for considering the 
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systemic costs of risk that cannot be hedged, due to the illiquidity of working class 
households.  
A consideration of illiquidity is critical because conceptions of risk in terms of 
individual choice and opportunity translate into the treatment afforded the 
financialised household in the political mainstream. In chapter 3, I examine the 
Australian Treasury’s Wellbeing Framework (TWF) as a practical application of the 
discourse of individualism and efficient markets. I focus on the ability of the TWF, 
which does actually incorporate risk and complexity as key dimensions of wellbeing, 
to account for the social particularities of working class financialised existence.  
In this section, I have outlined the way in which prevailing conceptions of financial 
risk are unable to come to terms with the financialised household, with particular 
emphasis on the limitations of such conceptions to deal with risk as it manifests itself 
for working class households.  This discussion provides the foundations for analysing 
the prominent ways in which risk is accounted for in cost of living measurements and 
in ‘wellbeing’ policy frameworks. I now turn to an empirical investigation of the way 
in which financial risk has come to the fore in working class daily functioning.  
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1.3 Risk Shifting: The Evidence 
 
In the introduction, I framed financialisation as a process of risk shifting, whereby the 
growth of market criteria has come to characterise both patterns of household 
expenditure and the provisioning of income. Here I nominate the key manifestations 
of risk shifting in relation to households (both at home and at work), for these are the 
sorts of processes that measurements of working class living standards are failing to 
capture.  
(i) Changing Patterns of household expenditure: 
In this sub-section, I outline the changing patterns of household expenditure, which 
have been underpinned by policies of deregulation and privatisation, and the shift of 
risk that such policies have involved. I begin by documenting some prominent 
examples of the shift of financial risk. Equally as important, however, as these notable 
manifestations, are the less prominent, and even subtle, instances of financial 
calculation. Indeed, it is less the case that all households have engaged with 
overwhelming levels of risk in specific areas such as housing or superannuation 
(although this may occur), but more that risk itself has come to pervade ever 
increasing facets of daily functioning.  
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a) Superannuation 
Changing patterns in the provision of retirement income over the past 40 years 
provide an illustrative example of the risk shifting process. Certainly, at this stage, 
superannuation schemes have not replaced pensions, and the proportion of eligible 
people receiving the Age Pension sat at 68% in June 2008 (ABS, 2009a). Of the 43% 
of retired Australians who have received some form of superannuation payment, the 
ABS notes that for the vast majority such payments are “not sufficient to guarantee a 
comfortable standard of retirement living” (ABS, 2009a).  
At the same time, ‘investing’ in superannuation schemes rather than relying solely on 
government pensions is both a legal requirement, as well as increasingly necessary for 
households to maintain pre-retirement standards of living. Before the implementation 
of the National Superannuation Scheme in 1992, which instituted the compulsory 
employer payment, award superannuation had legislated individuals to invest 
proportions of their income (Bryson, 1994: 303). The number of workers making 
payments to super schemes had risen from 40% in 1983 to 72% in 1991 (1994: 303). 
As of 2007, the proportion of employees with superannuation coverage had risen to 
94% (ABS, 2009a). Correspondingly, the proportion of eligible recipients receiving 
the maximum Age Pension fell from 67% in June 1991, to 56% in June 2008 (ABS, 
2009a). Indeed, the ABS states that: “It is expected that superannuation will 
eventually replace taxpayer funded income support as seniors’ main source of income 
in retirement” (2009a).  
The trend towards superannuation is of critical importance. It is reflective of 
successive and continuing government policies, which mandate that workers invest 
significant proportions of household income in share or equity markets, leaving 
households exposed to the volatility of such markets. Households are also responsible 
for discerning between a variety of different options in terms of fund managers and 
tailored packages. Mike Rafferty and Serena Yu depict the risk exposure resulting 
from such “privately managed, mandatory, defined-contribution pension financing” 
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(2010: 60), by measuring superannuation returns during the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) in 2008. In Australia, real investment return from superannuation was -26.7%, 
a negative return second only to Ireland out of nine OECD countries (Germany, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States, Japan and Canada), and well below the 
OECD average of -17.4% (2010: 61).  
Therefore, even if superannuation is, in theory, able to provide households with a 
comfortable retirement income (whether alongside the pension or potentially in-and-
of-itself in the future), the responsibility for absorbing the volatility of market driven 
post retirement income is being increasingly shifted from the state and onto 
households.  
b) Housing 
Housing is another critical area of household expenditure where changes have left 
households far more exposed to the risks associated with financial volatility.   
As I outlined in the introduction, considerable attention has been given in recent years 
to the increasing levels of household debt resulting from the rising costs of housing 
(see for example Keen, 2009; Yates, 2011). Judith Yates thus recorded in her address 
to the 2011 Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) conference: 
 
Prior to the 1970s a household on average weekly earnings had a borrowing 
capacity that was more than adequate to fund purchase of a median price 
dwelling. The foundations of this high and stable home ownership rate began 
to be challenged from about the mid 1980s with an emerging divergence of 
house prices in relation to income and, specifically, with the emergence of a 
deposit gap between what a household on average weekly earnings could 
afford to borrow (based on a 30 per cent repayment to income ratio) and 
median house prices (2011: 14). 
Indeed, between 1984 and 2004, housing as a total share of household expenditure 
increased from 14.5% to 18.3% (Rafferty & Yu, 2010: 57). 
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However, a focus on such concrete changes in costs captures only part of the picture. 
The Fujitsu Mortgage Stress-O-Meter recorded that between late 2007 and 2008 – a 
period over which debt levels had stagnated – mortgage stress levels more than 
quadrupled, with the most significant cause identified to be high interest rates 
(Fujitsu, 2010: 31). The rising costs associated with housing therefore represent not 
only a growing requirement of repayments, but a growing exposure to interest rate 
volatility. This signifies the increasing degree to which the consumption of housing 
has become a financial process as competition has been introduced into the housing 
market, with interest rates no longer regulated and set at a discount rate from 
commercial loans (Rafferty & Yu, 2010: 50).  
Such changes to the regulation of interest rates may have created opportunities for 
choice. Yet the fact that interest payments rise to assume a higher and higher 
proportion of disposable income make the decision surrounding the purchase of a 
house more and more critical, and place considerable requirements of calculation and 
choices about an uncertain future. The volatility of purchasing a house was 
exemplified in the early 1990s, when households with variable loans had to come to 
terms with interest rates of up to 17%. Additionally, the securing of a loan involves 
important calculations, surveys and judgements between different loans and interest 
payment plans, alongside the negotiation of bank fees. Given that home ownership 
levels sit at 70% (ABS, 2009c: 4), the fact that purchasing a home involves such 
financial exposure represents a significant cost for the Australian household.  
c) Insurance 
The past 15 years have witnessed a similar trend in the provisioning of healthcare. In 
2008, 53% of the Australian population had private health insurance (ABS, 2008). 
This was a significant change from the declining trend in the 1980s and 90s, following 
the implementation of Medicare. In these decades, the percentage investing in private 
health insurance had fallen from 80% in 1970 to 30% in the mid-1990s (Flood et. al., 
2004: 370).  
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This trend towards investment in private health has been underpinned by government 
policies, such as private subsidies, which have facilitated access to private health 
insurance.  In 1999, the government introduced a 30% Private Health Insurance 
Rebate scheme and sold off Medibank Private.  
The trend has also been underpinned by a relative decline in the coverage and 
provisioning provided through Medicare. Data that gives an aggregate picture on this 
issue is difficult to locate. Indeed, insurance status, while identified as a potential 
variable, has not been used in the Australian National Health Survey (Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare, 2012: 4). John Dwyer from the Evatt Foundation 
stated when considering levels of satisfaction with the Australian healthcare system 
that there is a lack of “empirically verifiable research… as there has been no in-depth 
community dialogue” (Dwyer, 2006).  
Nevertheless, there is evidence that many Australians are turning to private health 
insurance in order to guarantee adequate healthcare cover. This is the conclusion 
found by the Evatt Foundation:  
Australians are only too well aware that their healthcare system is increasingly 
unreliable, indeed dysfunctional. Public hospitals have major problems 
because of ever-increasing demand, under-funding and shortages of health 
professionals… Planned surgery is rationed. General practitioners must raise 
their fees to survive. The fees for specialists make it increasingly difficult for 
many citizens to benefit from their care. Individual financial capacity is 
increasingly a major determinant of health outcomes. (Dwyer, 2006, italics 
added). 
The Evatt Foundation’s view is reinforced by particular indicators from ABS data, 
such as that on patient experiences of health services. A 2009 survey found that 
people without private health insurance were: twice as likely not to have seen a GP; 
twice as likely to have found cost a barrier in accessing their medication; and, half as 
likely again to have delayed or not seen a specialist (ABS, 2009b). In relation to 
hospital services, the ABS concluded that “people who felt their health was excellent, 
very good or good were one and a half times more likely than people who felt their 
health was fair or poor to have been treated as a private patient” (ABS, 2009b). 
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Furthermore, in 2008, the ABS conducted an extensive survey that found that the 
most common reason of those surveyed (59%) for not having private health insurance 
was that they were unable to afford it (ABS, 2008). 
This trend towards private provisioning has resulted in households facing a trade-off 
between the risk of not having access to quality healthcare, and the costs associated 
with private health insurance. These latter costs themselves involve an increasing 
exposure to volatility and risk, as well as an increasing responsibility for complex 
calculations and decisions surrounding particular providers and schemes.  
Health insurance is the most significant of an array of insurance markets, which, 
alongside credit markets, have become increasingly pervasive in daily life. 
Households have to make decisions about the extent to which they engage with – and 
thus gain the coverage of – compulsory car and contents insurance, as well as newly 
emerging insurance markets. Such markets cover a range of both old and new 
products from mobile phones and other durables, to current and future income 
streams, to personal matters of illness, disability or death (Rafferty & Yu, 2010: 50).  
d) Tertiary Education 
Changing patterns of provision with tertiary education depict a similar trend. Since the 
1980s, successive governments have introduced, and progressively increased, the 
levels of a ‘user pays’ system of fees. In 2002, 67% of higher education students were 
required to pay HECS and 79% had ‘chosen’ to defer their payments, with the ABS 
predicting that these percentages would only increase in following years (ABS, 
2004a). The accessing of education therefore necessitates financial calculation. 
Increasing costs substantially intensify the requirement that students responsibly 
evaluate the value of going to university in terms of future job prospects, i.e. the value 
of ‘investing in (their own) human capital’. Furthermore, students must choose 
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between taking on debt through HECS, which the majority then pay off well into their 
working lives, or paying fees upfront and receiving a 20% discount.  
e) Utilities 
The same narrative of financial calculation describes the accessing of utilities. 
Policies of privatisation and decreasing price regulation have opened up markets for 
corporate investment in areas previously defined by public ownership. Changes in, for 
example, telecommunications and electricity, have shifted significant costs onto 
households (Cahill, 2005: 18; Anderson, 1999: 11), and have left households exposed 
and responsible for subsequent fluctuations in prices. Fundamentally, such changes 
have been characterised by the emergence of a choice between providers with 
complex contracts that are unlikely to be comprehended by the majority of citizens (or 
at least requiring significant financial literacy in order to interpret), entailing unclear 
and uncertain obligations for households to ‘responsibly’ manage into the future.  
~ 
These five instances of changes household expenditure have left households little 
option but to engage with an increasing array of risk exposures and responsibilities in 
their daily lives. Households are impelled to engage with these risks in order to 
maintain access to many subsistence goods and services, as well as gain access to 
emerging consumer items. This engagement raises particular issues for working class 
households, given their limited options in terms of engaging and being able to offset 
such risky exposure. Furthermore, as structural changes have necessitated such 
financial engagement, a cultural shift has also ensued: credit-financed consumption or 
systems of ‘user-pay’ HECS are becoming the expected norm, woven into the fabric 
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of household expenditure patterns. This can be seen on an increasingly continual 
rather than ad hoc basis. 
Such changes result in a growing level of household volatility. The following graph 
on the volatility of household wealth, constructed using RBA data by Rafferty and 
Yu, gives some aggregate picture of household risk. Detailing changes between 1994 
and 2009, this graph depicts the extent to which household wealth is now exposed to 
changes in capital markets. We see that levels of volatility skyrocketed between 2008 
and 2010, given the financial turbulence that characterised this period.  
Figure 1: Volatility of Household Wealth, 1994-2009 ($AU billions) 
 
 Source: Rafferty & Yu (2010: 54) 
Moreover, this graph, and the household risk exposure it reflects, only captures a part 
of the picture. The RBA data is limited to concrete changes in price volatility of 
particular assets and liabilities. This graph has therefore been constructed based on 
changes in the prices of financial assets (deposits, reserves of life offices and pension 
funds, shares and other equity and unfunded superannuation); non-financial assets 
(consumer durables and dwellings); and liabilities (RBA, 2010a). While the data offer 
an indication of the extent to which households are embedded in financial exposures, 
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the data do not account for the costs associated with such risky exposures. That is, the 
data are not conceived in applying a risk return calculation to households. Applying 
this calculation would require, not only accounting for the concrete changes in the 
price levels of, for example, superannuation schemes, but also compensating for the 
risk entailed in investing in such schemes.   
The methodology for calculating such risk would be very contentious, and is far 
beyond the scope of this thesis. It is nevertheless clear that households are facing 
significant risks in their daily expenditure patterns, which represent pressing 
considerations when accounting for household cost of living.  
(ii) Changes in the labour market 
Increasing levels of volatility in expected household income have reinforced the 
volatility in household expenditure. Over the past 40 years, labour market changes 
have made security of employment, wages and conditions (and, as I have outlined, 
security of pensions), far more precarious. There are several dimensions that I briefly 
consider in the following paragraphs.  
In the 1960s, approximately 90% of Australian workers were full-timers (Watson, 
2003: 47). As of May 2010, this proportion had fallen to 63.3% (ABS, 2010a). Of 
those employed, 36.7% were correspondingly part-time workers, and 21% (18% part-
time and 3% full-time) were employed on a casual basis (ABS, 2010a). Certainly, 
these changes in employment status indicate some desire for greater flexibility in the 
workforce. However, they are also reflective of an increasing contingency of 
employment. For example, 25% of all part-time workers state that they would prefer 
to work more hours (ABS, 2010a). Furthermore, such static and aggregate statistics 
often don’t capture many labour market contingencies: including underemployment; 
the number of long-term unemployed no longer looking for work; and the short-term 
nature of many employment options.  
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A second major consideration is that of income insecurity. In examining the setting of 
pay for employees in 2010, the ABS concluded that ‘Award only’ was the least 
common method of setting of pay (15.2%), with the most common methods being 
collective agreement (43.4%) and individual agreement (37.3%) (ABS, 2010b). This 
data on the setting of pay is reflective of a trend whereby, particularly since changes 
to the Accord laws in 1987, wage rises are increasingly tied to productivity rather than 
cost of living adjustments (Chester, 2012: 156). While this trend does not necessarily 
signify increasing levels of risk, it does leave income levels far more vulnerable to 
fluctuations in the macro economy. Such vulnerability is reflected in the following 
graph on income insecurity, which demonstrates the exposure of income levels to 
such fluctuations.  
Figure 2: Income Insecurity – Volatility of Average Weekly Ordinary Full-time 
Earnings, 1991-2009 ($AU) 
 
   Source: Rafferty & Yu (2010: 60) 
Significantly these data are based on average full-time earnings, and account for the 
trend changes in earnings over time. As Rafferty and Yu note such data demonstrate 
that during a recession (as we can glean in light of the current crisis) pressure on 
wages and hours manifests itself in rising income insecurity (2010: 59).  
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There is a further dimension to consider: namely, a trend of households shifting from 
a reliance on one income to a reliance on two. This trend, the correlation between this 
trend and the increasing risks and costs associated with household expenditure, and 
the implications for households, have been documented by Elizabeth Warren in 
relation to the United States: 
… the majority of families now have both parents rising at dawn so that they 
can both pull in paychecks… As a result, they have lost the parachute they 
once had in times of financial setback—a back-up earner who could go into 
the workforce if the primary earner got laid off or was sick… and for families 
where every penny of both paychecks is already fully committed to mortgage, 
health insurance, and other payments, then the loss of either paycheck can 
send them into a financial tailspin (Warren, 2006).  
It is a similar story in Australia. In 2011, ABS data on the employment status of 
‘couple families’ by age of youngest dependant, records that on average both people 
were employed in over 60% of families (ABS, 2011e). For couples with youngest 
dependent between 10 and 14, the proportion was 75% (ABS, 2011e). Even for 
families with a dependant under 4, the figure was still over 50% (ABS, 2011e). 
Critically, the change in composition of the labour market results in households being 
doubly exposed to increasingly insecure employment conditions (particularly to 
changes in income levels), and to ‘external’ factors such as illness or misadventure. 
This increasing contingency within the labour market often entrenches and reinforces 
the levels of precariousness associated with changes in household expenditure. As 
Rafferty and Yu state:  
As these fixed costs rise, and as more household labour has been added to the 
paid workforce to meet those costs, the household is now more sensitive to 
any shocks on either the cost or income side (2010: 56-57). 
For example, one of the main findings of a 2004 report on casual work, was the 
correlation between financial insecurity and casual work: 
Trouble with financial planning, borrowing and saving for retirement are 
amongst the significant financial costs of casual work (Pocock et. al., 2004: 7).  
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Similarly, it is increasingly the case that the only available response to mishaps in the 
workforce is to engage with more financial products. In such situations households 
may turn to credit markets, for example borrowing further against a mortgage or 
acquiring a personal loan, but also increasingly to insurance markets, with, for 
example, insurance on current income streams becoming more and more common 
(Bryan et. al., 2009: 462).  
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1.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have considered the distinct costs associated with household risk, 
and in particular working class household risk, and offered empirical support for the 
pervasiveness of such risk in daily life.  
I have shown that the past 40 years has been characterised by a shifting of financial 
risk, which Jacob Hacker describes as a shift of socially dispersed risk onto individual 
household units (2006: 5). Financial products, motives and calculations are pervading 
evermore facets of daily life alongside an increasing contingency of employment.  
Access to subsistence items requires households to expose themselves to the 
uncertain, insecure and volatile conditions of private markets. In so doing, they face 
the prospect of losing access to those same subsistence items, because of the volatility 
inherent within such private markets.  
The trend of increasingly pervasive financial risk is true for all households, but it is 
working class households that have incurred particular structural costs in the risk 
shifting process. This incurring of costs results from not only the increasing 
contingency of the labour market, but also due to the illiquidity of working class 
households’ primary household assets – subsistence goods and services. Working 
class households have far less opportunity than a firm, government or even household 
with significant asset holdings, to manage increasing costs and to reduce risk 
exposure.  
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The process of financialisation, therefore, has resulted in working class households 
absorbing increasing levels of financial risk; levels that represent a significant cost to 
be quantified when accounting for living standards in Australia. An account of this 
process of risk shifting remains missing from the conventional ‘never had it so good’ 
narrative, and the measurements and policy frameworks underpinning it. It is to such 
measurements and policy frameworks  – namely, the CPI and TWF – that I now turn.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
 
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is the principle measurement used to ascertain the 
living costs of the Australian household. It is a macroeconomic indicator of great 
political and economic influence, directly informing government, with notable import 
on the pursuit of particular monetary policies.  The CPI also informs private 
investment decisions and is used ‘as a means of maintaining dollar values’ – such as 
in the adjustment of welfare benefits, wages,4 and individual contracts, and the 
determination of acceptable rental agreements or insurance cover levels (ABS, 
2011c). As the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) notes, “the CPI directly or 
indirectly affects all Australians” (ABS, 2010c: 7). 
Despite this widespread influence, the CPI has been unable to account for the 
significant shift of financial risks onto the Australian household, as played out over 
the past 40 years. This neglect reflects the CPI’s systematic exclusion of household 
financial activity, an exclusion that occurs on two conceptual levels: (i) at the level of 
categories and methods of measurement; and, (ii) at the level of accounting for 
financial risk.  
Firstly, the categories and methods of measurement with which the ABS constructs 
the CPI, result in the exclusion of many financially linked items. In terms of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Since changes to the Accord Law 1987, however, the principle purpose of the CPI is no longer the 
indexation of wages, with wages rather increasingly linked to productivity (ABS, 2011c).  
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categories, the CPI has, since its inception in the 1960s, been based on the conceptual 
distinction between relevant consumption expenditure and ‘out-of-scope’ investment 
expenditure (ABS, 2011c). Methodologically, the CPI excludes prices for which no 
reliable and stable method of calculation – free from short-term volatility – can be 
constructed. Given that financial activity does always involve ‘investing’ in an asset, 
and is often characterised by excessive price volatility, such categories and methods 
result in an index that systematically excludes the costs associated with household 
finance.  
Significantly, this exclusion of financially linked items also reflects the political 
function performed by the CPI. Due to its ‘principal purpose’ of informing RBA 
monetary policy, the CPI must necessarily exclude any prices that reflect fluctuations 
in interest rates, and thus the RBA cash rate. Capturing the costs associated with 
increasingly pervasive financial markets is thus, at best, of secondary importance.  
Secondly, and on another conceptual level, the ABS affords no consideration to 
incorporating the costs associated with household risk into the CPI. That is, the ABS 
is limited by its conceptual treatment of household finance as “exchanging one form 
of asset for another” (ABS, 2010c: 28), which considers only the concrete price 
changes of particular assets and not the costs associated with risk exposure. Even if 
the ABS were to come to terms with the limitations of its methodology and 
categories, – as it has attempted in relation to financial services (detailed in section 
2.2) – the CPI would still not apply to households a risk return calculation, as 
categorically applied in relation to capital.  
The costs of finance and of financial risk have, however, come to characterise 
working class daily life in recent decades. These costs are now critical factors when 
determining household inflation, standard of living or adequate wages. While in the 
1960s, the accessing of subsistence items may have largely fallen into a simple 
category of ‘risk-free’ consumption, the same cannot be said today. Such access 
requires households to ‘invest’ in assets and an increasing array of financial 
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(particularly credit and insurance) products, and therefore to engage with the risks and 
volatility associated with financial markets. In not accounting for such changes, the 
CPI remains a “pre-financialised” index, leaving the risks absorbed by working class 
households over recent decades hidden and concealed.  
In developing this proposition, I structure this chapter as follows. In section 2.1, I 
outline the historical development, purpose and construction of the CPI, and identify 
some of the conclusions drawn from the measurement in relation to living standards 
in Australia. In section 2.2, I explain the CPI’s practical treatment of household 
financial activity. In demonstrating the systematic exclusion of many household 
financial activities, I link this treatment to the political function of the CPI and its 
connection with the RBA cash rate. In section 2.3, I return to the critical consideration 
of household risk, explaining that all these debates surrounding the relevance of 
household finance rest on a purely distributional – and thus risk-free – understanding 
of financial activity. This final point in particular signifies the emerging incoherence 
of the CPI at a time when household engagement in financial activities has not only 
blurred the distinction between consumption and investment expenditure, and made 
volatile prices a characteristic of daily life, but has also resulted in pervasive exposure 
to financial risk. 
 41 
 
2.1 What is the CPI? 
 
The CPI is an index that measures the price increases experienced by the metropolitan 
Australian household.  
Retail Price indices had first been used in World War One to calculate the extent to 
which workers were affected by changing wartime prices, and thus to determine an 
appropriate increase in real wages to maintain real living standards (ABS, 2011c). The 
CPI itself was first introduced in the 1960s. Measuring quarterly changes in retail 
prices, the design of CPI was largely consistent with these earlier indices. However, it 
aimed to compile a series of shorter-term indices that could be linked in longer-term 
series, replacing the former emphasis on long-term trends (ABS, 2011c).  
The CPI determines household inflation by measuring the price changes of household 
consumption goods and services. Such prices are determined by calculating the cost 
of purchasing a fixed ‘basket’ of consumer items of a constant quality and similar 
characteristics that is judged to be representative of a household’s expenditure during 
a particular time period (ABS, 2011c). In calculating the index, each item in the 
basket is accorded a numerical ‘weight’ to reflect its importance to household 
expenditure in relation to other goods and services consumed (ABS, 2010c: 38). The 
basket is broken into numerous categories and subgroups, such as food and non-
alcoholic beverages, and housing. The CPI therefore allows the prices across a diverse 
range of items with different unit or quantity measurements to be calculated and 
compared (ABS, 2011c). As a temporal index, these comparisons occur across 
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specific, and in the case of the CPI, quarterly, time periods. A particular ‘base’ or 
reference period is selected, against which all other measurements are compared.  
The formal method utilised by the ABS to calculate the CPI is the ‘acquisitions’ 
method. This method includes only the costs of the goods and services acquired (or 
received) by the reference population in the particular time period, regardless of the 
period in which payment or use occurs (ABS, 2011c). This distinction is significant 
given that consumers may acquire, use, and pay for goods and services in different 
time periods. That the ABS employs the acquisitions method signals both its 
recognition of the role of credit in household expenditure, but also its decision to 
separate the costs associated with credit from consumer expenditure. Prior to 1998, 
the CPI had been measured according to the ‘outlays’ approach that incorporated the 
costs of all goods and services for which payments were made, regardless of the 
source of funds. As I outline in section 2.2, this change in method was significant in 
that it was driven by the perceived vulnerability of the outlays approach to changes in 
interest rate levels. These levels are, firstly, not considered relevant to household 
consumption; and secondly, reflective of changes in the RBA cash rate: a position that 
is unfeasible given the purpose of the CPI of informing RBA policy.   
The CPI is subject to ongoing revision to account for changes in the consumer basket 
and maintain its relevance as an index. Changes in ‘weight’ across time periods are 
referred to as quantity changes. The prices calculated also account for changes in 
quality; that is, whether items have been changed or modified such that their value 
changes for the consumer. In such cases the ABS removes any change in price that is 
attributable purely to change in quality (ABS, 2011c). The CPI is therefore 
consistently reviewed and re-weighted every six years (at which point a new series is 
released) to account for such quantity and quality changes, as well as to review the 
prevailing methods of classification and sampling. For example, the 2011 16th series 
CPI adjusted the consumer basket to account for the increased accessibility, 
affordability and quality of electronic items: 
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Following the 15th series review, the base weight for audio, visual and 
computing (AVC) equipment was 1.5 per cent, but by the June quarter 2011 
the effective weight for this component had declined to just 0.5 per cent, given 
the large price declines that had occurred… However, the new weight is 
similar to that in 2005, reflecting the fact that households have purchased 
more AVC goods as prices have declined (RBA, 2011).  
Continual revisions have led to considerable changes in the make-up and scope of the 
CPI, but have not changed its original purpose and function of measuring consumer 
price inflation.  
That inflation in the price of a basket of consumption goods and services (as 
calculated by the CPI) has not exceeded the increase in working class income, is 
generally accepted to reflect positively on the standard of living in Australia in recent 
decades. That is, that the conclusions drawn from CPI data support the dominant 
narrative of growing real wages, and of an Australian household that ‘has never had it 
so good’. This understanding is reflected in the Assistant Governor of the RBA Phillip 
Lowe’s 2011 address: 
Since 2000, the economy-wide real consumption wage has increased by 
around 25 per cent, which represents a substantial increase in the purchasing 
power of the average wage (Lowe, 2011). 
Furthermore, the CPI also indicates that the variety, quantity and quality of many 
items now included in the household consumption basket has significantly expanded 
over the past 40 years, which has also had a positive effect on living standards. The 
previously mentioned example of increased accessibility, affordability and quality of 
computers exemplifies this. 
Certainly, the narrative that the CPI depicts of an increasing abundance of relatively 
affordable consumer durables is not inaccurate. However, it only captures part of the 
story. Despite constant review and revision, the simultaneous ascendency of financial 
risks in daily life remains absent from such a narrative, with significant political 
repercussions. In addressing this critical point, the following sections outline the 
CPI’s conceptual engagement with household finance, and in particular financial risk.  
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2.2 The ABS’s Treatment of Household Finance: 
Its Approach to Finance and Consumption 
 
The ABS explains its treatment of household finance in its review of the 16th series 
CPI: 
The creation or extinction of financial assets/liabilities by lending, borrowing 
and repayments, are financial transactions that are different from expenditures 
on goods and services and take place independently of them. For example, 
households may borrow in order to finance final expenditure (e.g. on housing, 
holidays or medical services). A financial transaction merely rearranges the 
individual’s asset portfolio by exchanging one type of asset for another, as 
such no consumption occurs (ABS, 2010c: 38). 
The treatment outlined here overwhelmingly excludes household financial activity 
from the CPI. The systematic exclusion occurs on two conceptual levels: (i) at the 
level of categories and methods of measurement; and, (ii) at the level of accounting 
for financial risk. I have divided consideration of these two levels across sections 2.2 
and 2.3 within this chapter.  
On one conceptual level, the CPI – informed by its political function of informing 
monetary policy – employs categories and methods of measurement that exclude 
many financially linked items from the consumer basket. There are two particular 
features of the CPI that lead to such exclusion: firstly, the conceptual distinction 
between household consumption expenditure and household investment expenditure; 
and secondly, the exclusion of ‘volatile’ prices for which the CPI is unable to 
construct a stable method of calculation. Behind such definitional and methodological 
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difficulties is a political narrative, with the ABS particularly stringent about excluding 
any prices that embody changes in interest rate prices. This is due to the causal 
relationship between the CPI and RBA monetary policy, with the CPI an input in the 
determination of the RBA cash rate. It would involve a circular logic for the CPI to 
also reflect changes in the RBA cash rate.  
Not withstanding the conundrum posed by such circularity, such exclusions result in a 
‘pre-financialised’ CPI: a measure that adopts categories and methodologies that are 
unable to account for those changing patterns of household expenditure that have 
made engagement with volatile financial activity (investment) a condition of access to 
many consumption items. In the remainder of this section, I detail how these 
definitional and methodological, and indeed political, limitations translate into the 
CPI’s treatment of household finance.   
However, before I outline these limitations in the CPI’s treatment of household 
finance, it is important to outline the second conceptual level, whereby the CPI is 
limited by its understanding of household finance as simply “exchanging one form of 
asset for another” (ABS, 2010c: 28). This conception of household finance cannot 
account for the fact that different assets carry differing levels of risks, irrespective of 
their dollar value. As I established in the previous chapter, the cost of such differing 
levels of risk is a fact well established in relation to capital, yet the CPI denies the 
same risk return calculus when calculating household living costs. The implication of 
this second conceptual level is that even if or when the ABS attempts to incorporate 
‘investment’ or ‘volatile’ items into the CPI, or indeed its complementary Analytical 
Living Cost Indexes, the ABS is only accounting for the concrete fluctuations in 
particular asset prices, not the underlying risk exposure that is not reflected in such 
dollar values. I return to this second and critical limitation in section 2.3 of this 
chapter. 
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(i) A measurement of consumer expenditure 
The CPI is conceived in determining household inflation according to the changing 
prices of all important consumption goods and services. The ABS defines consumer 
goods and services as those items “from which households directly derive utility or 
satisfaction” (ABS, 2011c). Here, consumer expenditure is necessarily distinguished 
from investment activity, which involves the acquisition and financing of assets or 
business related purchases, and delayed utility or satisfaction.  
Household financial activity is categorized as investment, which is “different from 
expenditure on consumer goods and services” (ABS, 2010c: 28), and is thus ‘out of 
scope’ of the CPI. The exclusion of household financial activity is exemplified in the 
ABS’s treatment of three prominent areas of financial activity: namely interest rates, 
superannuation and life insurance: 
• Interest Rates: With the exception of the indirect fees embedded in interest 
rate margins (see part iii), the ABS classifies interest rate payments as 
expenditure for the purpose of investment: “Interest paid is not a charge that is 
within scope of the CPI basket” (ABS, 2011c). This is despite the fact that the 
underlying asset upon which the interest is being paid may be classified as part 
of household consumption. 
• Superannuation: Consistent with its treatment of interest rates, the ABS 
classifies expenditure on superannuation as for the purpose of investment, 
with the exception of the costs of the financial services provided in relation to 
superannuation products (see part iii). Payments on premiums and 
contributions are excluded from the CPI.  
• Insurance: The CPI does include an insurance category within its consumer 
basket. However, it is limited to comprehensive insurance for dwellings and 
motor vehicles, and compulsory third party motor vehicle insurance services. 
This definition leaves most forms of insurance relegated to the category of 
investment; including health insurance, life and disability insurance, various 
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insurance products related to guaranteeing income or the value of assets such 
as superannuation investments, and the everyday insurance which is 
increasingly available in the purchase of many consumer durables.  
The ABS has not always separated such ‘assets’ from questions of household 
consumption. In the 1960s the CPI did treat the vast majority of the costs associated 
with housing, retirement income and healthcare as processes of household 
consumption. For example, prior to 1986 the CPI measured interest-rates as part of 
the cost of owner-occupied housing before such costs were associated with “financing 
the acquisition of assets” (RBA, 1998: 2). However, financialised expenditure is now 
determined to be for the purpose of investment and excluded from the measure.  
This separation of financialised investment from household consumption neglects a 
critical point: that financial investment has become a condition of access to 
subsistence items. Therefore, although these three areas of activity do always involve 
investing in an asset, financial changes mean that such assets are far from separate to 
questions of ‘direct utility’. The interest paid in securing a loan is not separable from 
the utility value of the underlying asset being serviced. Expenditure on 
superannuation is not only a legal requirement, but also necessary for guaranteeing an 
adequate income during retirement. And while, in the 1960s, public healthcare was 
seen as sufficient to meet an average working family’s health needs, today these same 
needs increasingly require investing in private health insurance. Household finance 
has therefore blurred the distinction between consumption and investment. In today’s 
context, a  ‘subsistence wage’ must cover not only the income necessary to spend and 
save in order to access particular consumer durables, but also the income necessary 
for households to access, through financial channels, those goods and services no 
longer covered by governments or particular industries. However, the CPI does not 
account for such changes, constrained by the ‘pre-financialised’ definitions and 
categories in which it was conceived.  
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(ii) A stable measurement 
The ‘pre-financialised’ nature of the CPI is also exemplified in the ABS’s exclusion 
of prices of many items that are vulnerable to market volatility, and for which no 
consistent and robust method of measurement can be developed.  
The ABS is forthright in discussing the methodological difficulties that volatile prices 
pose for the CPI. As a smooth time series, the CPI relies on being able to measure and 
compare the stable prices of goods and services, separating the underlying inflationary 
trend from short-term fluctuations in prices (ABS, 2010c: 26). The importance of this 
separation is reflected in the considerable attention afforded to measuring the price 
changes of particularly volatile items such as petrol and food. Both items remain 
included, given the ABS’s commitment to “reflect the real world volatility that may 
occur in contemporary movements in prices” (ABS, 2010c: 26), but are calculated at a 
higher frequency than other goods and services. 
Other volatile prices, however, for which the ABS has been unable to develop a 
‘sufficiently robust’ method of calculation, remain excluded from the CPI. This has 
applied particularly to those items associated with financial activity given that 
household expenditure on risky items is reflected in volatile and fluctuating prices.  
This exclusion of financially linked items is reflected in the ABS’s decision to change 
from the ‘outlays’ to the ‘acquisitions’ method of calculation. The outlays approach 
incorporates the costs of all items for which payments are made, regardless of the 
source of the funds, and thus includes any ‘follow-up’ costs such as interest rate 
charges or payments for the flow of services imputed over the life of the original 
underlying asset. The ABS determined that the incorporation of such variable and 
unpredictable ‘follow-up’ costs left the CPI excessively vulnerable to the impact of 
external pressures, including (as I outline below) changes in the RBA cash rate (ABS, 
2010c: 42). By contrast, the adopted acquisitions approach avoids such variable and 
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unpredictable costs, by incorporating only the expenditure on goods and services 
actually received during the reference time period.  
The shifting of financial risk onto working-class households, however, means that 
such volatile ‘follow-up’ costs (including costs affected by changes in RBA policy) 
have become a feature of daily life. In a similar and related way to ‘investing in 
assets’, such costs are now an obligation in order to maintain access to the subsistence 
items of adequate housing, retirement income, healthcare, education, and, 
increasingly, a stable income. In this context it is important to remember that 
household consumption is financed more and more through credit, and thus the 
‘volatile’ interest payments and penalty charges associated with credit markets. 
Furthermore, credit fueled consumption is occurring in an increasingly de jour rather 
than ad hoc basis. The prevalence of credit is reflected in the ratio of household debt 
to income, which rose from less than 40% in the late 1970s to over 150% in 2011 
(Freestone et. al., 2011: 64). The prevalence of penalty charges is exemplified in the 
current class action being run by Australian law firm Maurice Blackburn, against the 
“unfair” exception fees of late credit card payments, bounced cheques or overdrawn 
accounts (Ockenden, 2012). The action involves 170,100 bank customers in relation 
to $223 million in fees, which is only “skimming the surface” of the $1.3 billion that 
banks charged in fees in 2009 (Watson, 2012).5   
These ‘follow-up’ costs signify that the impact of volatile financial markets are no 
longer external to household consumption, and have instead become a determining 
factor in many aspects of household expenditure. For example, household expenditure 
on the interest rates paid in servicing a home loan is often directly affected by external 
fluctuations, including, notably, changes in the RBA cash rate. The Genworth report 
on homebuyer confidence (as cited in my introduction), after stating that Australia has 
one of the largest percentages in the world of homeowners with a variable mortgage 
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in 2009. In 2010, banks charged Australian households $652 million in such “exception” fees (Watson, 
2012).  
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rate, contends that changes in the RBA cash rate have a major effect on homebuyer 
sentiment:  
It does not take much of an increase or decrease of cash rates for this to feed 
through directly into homebuyer pockets and homebuyer sentiment 
(Genworth, 2012: 1).  
Even in cases where interest rates are fixed, banks take into account the volatility or 
risks of financial markets in the setting of such fixed rates. Similarly, household 
decisions of how much income to place in superannuation funds, or which provider to 
utilise, are increasingly affected by considerations relating to the volatility of financial 
markets. This was exemplified by the negative effect of the GFC on retirement 
income (as I outlined in chapter 1), and the response of many households who 
attempted to shift savings to less exposed funds. 
Evidently, there is considerable overlap between the exclusion of prices due to 
volatility and those excluded as ‘out-of-scope’ investment expenditure. This signifies 
the inseparability of ‘investment’ activities and exposure to financial volatility, both 
of which remain systematically excluded from the CPI.  
(iii) Attempted incorporation of financial services 
The limitation of excluding financially linked items has not gone unnoticed by the 
ABS. This recognition is reflected in the ABS’s attempt to incorporate the fees and 
charges associated with financial services into the index.   
In recent years, the national and international statistical community has afforded 
considerable attention to the question of whether certain aspects of household 
financial activity fall into the category of consumption. In 1997, a review conducted 
of the 13th series CPI concluded that the costs associated with the provision of 
financial services constitute a component of household consumption expenditure 
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(ABS, 1997).  Financial services referred to “all those services acquired by 
households in relation to the acquisition, holding and disposal of financial and real 
assets” (ABS, 1997). While the “acquisition, holding and disposal of financial assets” 
was still considered investment expenditure, the fees and charges paid in relation to 
such assets were determined to “represent a payment by households for a service they 
obtain”, and were thus determined to be conceptually significant in the measurement 
of household inflation (ABS, 2010c: 12).  
The ABS identified many examples of financial services, including: financial advice; 
currency exchange; deposit and loan facilities; services provided by fund managers, 
life insurance offices and superannuation funds; stockbroking services; and, real 
estate agency services (ABS, 1997). From September 1998 to December 2003 an 
experimental index of two expenditure classes was established to measure the price 
change for those services the ABS deemed the most significant and for which it felt 
able to construct a sufficiently robust and stable measure (ABS, 2005). The first class 
of the experimental index was the deposit and loan (D&L) facilities – or banking 
services – provided to households by financial institutions (ABS, 2004b). 
Significantly, the D&L facilities included both direct and indirect charges. Direct 
charges refer to explicit payments such as monthly fees, transaction (ATM) fees, 
access fees, arrangement or cessation of products fees and account keeping fees. 
Indirect charges refer to the often-unobservable fees embodied in interest rate 
margins, consisting largely of the income earned by banks when lending funds at a 
higher rate of interest than they pay on deposits. Financial institutions regularly 
substitute direct and indirect charges (as both represent a payment for a service). The 
second expenditure class of the experimental index was labelled ‘other financial 
services’ and, due to concerns of reliability and stability, was restricted to those 
services provided by stockbrokers and real-estate agencies (ABS, 2011c).  
The outcomes of the 13th series review and the subsequent establishment of an 
experimental index were consistent with reviews and discussions taking place 
throughout the international statistics community, although the ABS was alone in 
including the indirect charges component. In 2005, the ABS therefore introduced 
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financial services, based on this experimental index, into the 15th series CPI. 
However, in the subsequent 16th series CPI, the ABS announced the decision to 
remove the indirect charges component from the D&L subgroup (ABS, 2011a).  
The volatility surrounding the measurement of indirect charges had always posed a 
significant challenge for the ABS, exemplifying the ABS’s concern surrounding the 
inclusion of volatile costs. This is because the indirect costs embedded within interest 
rate margins, as the name implies, are not directly observable. It is only the prices of 
services bundled in interest rate payments (the actual fees and charges), separate from 
the interest rate itself, which are accounted for. Furthermore, the amounts paid as 
interest margins on any single product vary significantly, depending on factors such 
as the type of account, the frequency of particular transaction types, the account 
balance and the total volume of business that the customer conducts with the service 
provider (ABS, 2010c: 12).  
In light of such complexity, the ABS calculated indirect costs based on a ‘reference 
rate of interest’, with the value of services provided to a borrower corresponding to 
the difference between the amount of interest paid, and the amount that would have 
been paid if a reference rate was used (ABS, 2005).6  Significant discussion and 
debate was held at a national and international level about how to calculate a ‘pure’ or 
stable reference rate that would not be vulnerable to volatility (see for example ABS, 
2010c: 11; Mink, 2011: 5). The ABS determined that the mid-point between the 
borrowing and lending rate would provide a “pragmatic and stable” rate (ABS, 2010c: 
11).  
However, during the GFC, the calculation of indirect charges proved to be too 
unstable for the CPI, reinforcing the view of many within the international statistical 
community. The 16th series review thus stated that: “The GFC has demonstrated that 
the ABS methodology used to calculate indirect fees is not sufficiently robust” (ABS, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See ABS (2011c) for a detailed explanation of the reference rate of interest.   
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2010c: 16).7 Of particular concern was that the reference rate proved highly 
susceptible to fluctuations in interest rate movements, and was thus vulnerable to 
changes in the RBA cash rate. Given the relatively large weight (4%) of the D&L 
subgroup, this correlation had a considerable effect on the whole CPI. For example, 
the D&L index rose by 16% over the year to September 2008 (in response to interest 
rate changes), which added almost ¾ of a percentage point to CPI inflation (RBA, 
2010b). 
The concerns outlined by the ABS mirrored the concerns raised by the RBA in its 
submission to the 16th series review, namely: 
… the degree of volatility and correlation with the Bank’s policy interest rate; 
the sampling methodology underlying the estimation of household interest 
margins; and its large weight in the CPI (RBA, 2010b).  
The ABS therefore resolved, in accordance with the RBA’s recommendations, to 
exclude such indirect charges until the key concerns associated with an acceptably 
robust (not volatile) estimation of price changes were addressed (ABS, 2011b). The 
ABS also announced the construction of a new index to incorporate such indirect fees 
and charges. As I outline below, this new index complemented a number of 
alternative Analytical Living Cost Indexes.  
Significance of Removal: 
In announcing the omission of indirect fees and charges, the ABS emphasised their 
belief that “conceptually both indirect and direct charges should be included… as they 
are [both] real payments for services consumed by households” (ABS, 2011b). 
However, the omission is symptomatic of the definitional and methodological 
weaknesses in the CPI’s systematic exclusion of ‘investment’ and ‘volatile’ items. 
These weaknesses manifest in two ways.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 In addition to such methodological problems, concerns were also raised in relation to the accuracy of 
the data, with the high quality detailed data required from financial institutions unavailable (ABS, 
2010c: 16).  
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Firstly, the exclusion is consistent with the ABS’s continued treatment of other types 
of financial services. Despite now being classified as items of household 
consumption, many of these services have never been incorporated into the CPI due to 
similar concerns surrounding the volatility of calculation. For example, in discussing 
the treatment of services associated with superannuation and life insurance, the ABS 
was resolute that such services “are within the conceptual scope of the CPI” (2004b). 
Nevertheless, the costs remain excluded because “the complexity of the charging 
arrangements... and the industry itself, makes it difficult to create a robust and 
representative price measure” (ABS, 2004b).  
Secondly, the exclusion of indirect charges is consistent with the CPI’s treatment of 
the vast majority of household financial activity, as outlined at the start of this section. 
That is, while the ABS has determined that financial services fall into the category of 
consumption expenditure, the remainder (and majority) of financial activity – 
including the financial items to which such financial services often pertain – remains 
classified as investment activity (ABS, 2010c: 12).8 The difference in classification is 
exemplified by the necessity for the D&L index to not embody changes in interest rate 
levels, which are still classified as investment expenditure.  
Furthermore, the separate index that the ABS has constructed to measure indirect 
charges is consistent with the ABS’s construction of many such alternative indexes. 
Labelled Analytical Living Cost Indexes, these “true” cost of living indexes measure 
the prices of items that cannot be incorporated into the CPI but are nevertheless 
recognised as representing a cost for households: 
With the change of principal purpose and design of the CPI in 1998, the ABS 
developed a series of analytical measures specifically designed to measure 
changes in living costs (ABS, 2010c: 40). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This distinction is made clear by the ABS: 
Deposits and loans themselves are not consumption goods or services. However, financial 
institutions provide services such as financial intermediation (matching the requirements of 
borrowers with lenders), security and automatic teller machine access. These services are 
consumed by households and therefore fees associated with them should be included in a CPI. 
(ABS, 2010: 12).  
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These indexes are based on the outlays approach, and while they may be far from 
comprehensive in their coverage of financially linked items, they do include items 
such as interest payments and financial services.9 
In constructing such indexes, and like its attempt to incorporate financial services, the 
ABS acknowledges the changing nature of household expenditure: that questions of 
consumption capacity, a subsistence wage and standard of living no longer occupy a 
separate sphere to financial activity. However, in relegating consideration of such 
financial costs to alternative indexes, the CPI – as the measure that directly informs 
policy and is used as a macro economic indicator – remains largely ‘pre-
financialised’. 
(iv) The politics of financial exclusion 
Underpinning much of the exclusion of financially linked items is a political 
narrative, whereby the CPI must necessarily exclude prices that are vulnerable to 
changes in the RBA cash rate. This requirement is because the principal policy 
purpose of the CPI is to directly inform RBA monetary policy, which means that it is 
‘unfeasible’ for the CPI itself to reflect the RBA cash rate. The RBA explained this 
problem when justifying the 1986 removal of interest rates from the CPI:  
The inclusion of interest changes meant that some movements in the CPI were 
a mechanical result of movements in the monetary policy instrument, rather 
than reflecting genuine pressures in the economy: a rise in interest rates to 
contain inflationary pressures would initially increase the CPI. This leads to an 
obvious problem if monetary policy were to be evaluated using such a 
measure of prices. (RBA, 1998: 2). 
The CPI’s principal policy function has therefore underpinned a number of financially 
significant decisions. In addition to the decision to remove interest rate payments 
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The CPI therefore rose slower than alternative indexes, despite the latter’s significant exclusion of 
house prices.   
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(which also reflected the context of growing commitment to a monetary policy based 
around inflation targeting), the CPI’s policy function also underpinned the 1998 
decision to change from the outlays to the acquisitions method of measurement. 
Furthermore, this function underpins the continuing exclusion of indirect fees and 
charges, because such charges embody interest rate volatility and thus changes in the 
RBA cash rate.  
The CPI therefore prioritizes elements that go towards informing monetary policy, 
even if this is at the expense of measuring cost of living. Indeed, this is explicitly 
acknowledged by both the RBA (2010b) and the ABS:  
The principal purpose of the Australian CPI is to measure inflation faced by 
consumers to support macroeconomic policy decision-making… [and] not to 
reflect all out-of-pocket expenses (ABS, 2010c: 4). 
In an increasingly financialised world, there is a politically necessary gap between 
measuring lived changes in costs of living – for which interest rate payments are a 
significant consideration – and the requirements of the CPI to feed into the 
inflationary calculation of the RBA. This contradiction underpins the failure of the 
CPI to reflect many of the costs of financial engagement; costs that now characterize 
day-to-day consumption expenditure.   
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2.3 The ABS’s Treatment of Household Finance: 
Its Approach to Household Risk 
 
This chapter has thus far outlined the ABS’s systematic exclusion of household 
financial activity from the CPI, and identified some of the reasons for this exclusion. 
However, the preceding discussion has remained silent on the ‘hidden’ dimension of 
risk. The ABS’s silence on this dimension means that even if the ABS was to 
overcome the methodological and political barriers and incorporate financial costs, it 
would still only incorporate part of the costs associated with household finance: 
namely, the concrete changes in the prices of particular items/assets. It would not 
measure the risk exposure – the implicit uncertainty and precariousness embodied in 
increasing dimensions of household consumption – that is not reflected in such prices. 
It is towards the ‘hidden’ dimension of risk that I now turn. 
In chapter 1, I established that since the development of the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) in the 1950s, it is an undisputed assumption that investing involves 
exposure to financial risk, and that such risk represents a cost above and beyond the 
cost of the underlying asset (Reinsdorf, 2011: 7). Neoclassical equilibrium models 
assume that risk exposure will be compensated by a risk premium and higher expected 
rate of return. Extensive attention is afforded to developing complex methods and 
devices of risk management, such as products to hedge against interest rate and 
foreign exchange rate exposure. Indeed, such risk management has become an integral 
part of the business of financial institutions, corporations and governments (Grahl & 
Lysandrou, 2003: 678). While the appropriate method for pricing risk may remain 
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heavily contested, there is no question that such costs exist to be modeled, accounted 
for and addressed.  
However, there is no consideration from the ABS of applying a risk-return calculus to 
the risk-exposed household, even when the ABS attempts to account for household 
finance. This lack of consideration is because the ABS conceives of household 
finance as simply “exchanging one form of asset for another” (ABS, 2010c: 28), 
which affords no scope for accounting for the fact that different assets expose 
households to differing levels of precariousness or uncertainty. Such precariousness 
and uncertainty, however, now characterise daily life, with significant components of 
consumption buttressed by the hedging of risk. This includes the risk of being 
precluded from future consumption and the risks associated with an increasingly 
contingent labour market. The ABS has remained silent on such changes. This means 
that even if the ABS were to put the issue of price volatility aside (as it has been able 
to do with food and petrol); even if it were able to convince the RBA that it was 
acceptable that the CPI embodied changes in the RBA cash rate; and, even if it were 
to incorporate all those prices that it currently relegates to alternative indexes 
(superannuation, interest rates etc); it would still only recognise the concrete price 
changes and not the implicit costs – the household ‘alpha’ – of financial risk.  
Given that the CPI is the major measure of household inflation in Australia, this 
silence on the question of household risk represents a significant oversight. Many 
financial costs now absorbed by households, such as those associated with retirement 
income or fluctuations in the labour market, were accounted for when they were 
covered by the state or capital. However, there is no ‘alpha’ to account for the risks 
now absorbed by households as they access such subsistence items.  
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Indirect Charges debate: 
The discrepancy in the treatment of the risk-exposed household is reflected in the 
international debates surrounding the measurement of indirect fees and charges. These 
debates relate to the definition and treatment of indirect charges – labeled FISIM: 
‘Financial Intermediation Services Indirectly Measured’ – in both consumer price 
indices and also in measurements of the risk management and liquidity transformation 
undertaken by financial and non-financial institutions.  
In relation to these institutions, one of the main reasons for incorporating FISIM 
charges is to account for the risks faced in investing, given the growing international 
consensus that FISIM charges faced by financial institutions reflect the risk and 
maturity structure of financial assets and liabilities. Marshall Reinsdorf from the US 
Department of Commerce states that a financial institution’s value added must be 
adequate to compensate for inherent levels of risk (2011: 7). Similarly, Reimund 
Mink from the European Central Bank makes the recommendation that FISIM 
charges be incorporated in such a way that allow the degree of default risk to be 
calculated (2011: 16). 
This treatment stands in stark contrast to that afforded to the FISIM charges relating 
to household consumption. Here, there has been no discussion of adjusting a 
household’s ‘value added’ to account for the risk exposure embedded in increasing 
forms of household expenditure. Instead, and reflecting the position adopted by the 
ABS, the focus is on finding a stable reference rate of interest unaffected by the 
volatility of financial markets and the RBA cash rate. As stated by Derick Cullen from 
the ABS, the aim is to find a rate that “provides some insulation from the impacts of 
interest rate movements that characterised the global financial crisis” (2011: 4). While 
significant emphasis is placed on the importance of accounting for the risk associated 
with the FISIM charges in relation to capital, there is no question of affording the 
same treatment – the same account of the costs associated with exposure to financial 
risk – to households.  
 60 
The CPI’s neglect of household risk signifies a critical conceptual limitation, beyond 
that of particular categories, methodology or political purpose. It means that even 
attempts to transcend the problems identified in the previous two sections will only 
afford a part of the picture of household costs. Until the importance of the risk return 
calculus in relation to households is acknowledged, the CPI will remain a measure 
stuck in the 1960s, concealing the significant financial costs now absorbed by the 
Australian household.   
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2.4 Conclusion: 
 
Over recent decades a significant shift has occurred, transferring the risk and costs 
associated with accessing an increasing array of subsistence items onto households. 
As I outlined in Chapter 1, the accessing of housing, adequate healthcare, retirement 
income, education, and a secure income necessitates engaging with risky financial 
activity. Indeed, that the minimal financial services subgroup alone accounts for 5% 
of the CPI weighting pattern (ABS, 2011c), elucidates the importance of financial 
activity when it comes to questions of consumer inflation, standard of living or 
subsistence wages.  
The pervasiveness of such household financial activity remains systematically 
neglected by the CPI. On one conceptual level, the exclusion of both investment 
related and volatile expenditure, with an underlying political necessity of not 
embodying interest rate volatility, leaves the CPI heavily biased against accounting 
for the changes to the ‘financialised’ household’s expenditure patterns. This bias is 
exemplified by the failure of the CPI to incorporate the indirect fees and charges 
associated with financial services.  
On another conceptual level, I have also outlined a more fundamental limitation: the 
failure of the CPI to account for the costs associated with financial risk above and 
beyond the cost of the underlying asset. In excluding the costs associated with risk, 
the CPI loses contact with the ‘real’ costs of securing long-term levels of 
consumption. 
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The neglect of financialised risk is far from isolated to the CPI, whose treatment of 
financial activity is both conceptually and methodologically consistent with the 
recommendations of the International CPI manual (ABS, 2010c: 44). Nevertheless, 
the CPI’s neglect is of particular importance given the central role of the CPI in 
“assisting government economists in conducting general economic policy, especially 
monetary policy” (ABS, 2011c). The cost of risk is absent from key policy areas such 
as the indexation of wages and welfare benefits, as well as RBA interest rate policy. 
This neglect only gains a greater significance when the class dimension of 
financialisation, as I outlined in chapter 1, is factored into the equation, whereby 
working class households face particular costs due to their illiquidity. These political 
implications exemplify the significance of a pre-financialised conception of 
household consumption, which leaves the CPI increasingly anachronistic in an era 
characterised by financial risk.  
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CHAPTER 3: 
THE TREASURY WELLBEING 
FRAMEWORK 
 
The central responsibility of the Australian Treasury is to develop policy frameworks 
to improve the wellbeing of the Australian people. In 2004, it released the Treasury 
Wellbeing Framework (TWF), identifying five key constituents of wellbeing: (i) the 
level of opportunity and freedom that people enjoy; (ii) the level of consumption 
possibilities; (iii) the distribution of those consumption possibilities; (iv) the level of 
risk that people are required to bear; and, (v) the level of complexity that people are 
required to deal with (The Treasury, 2009[2004]: 6; italics added). Unlike the analysis 
that underlies the CPI, the Treasury does identify risk and complexity as central 
dimensions of wellbeing (or living standards). This has not, however, translated into a 
systematic account of the pervasiveness of risky, complex and costly financial 
activities in the daily life of the Australian household.  
The absence of a comprehensive account of risk is because the Treasury conceives of 
the existence of household risk and complexity akin to the individual preferences of a 
firm or government.  For the Treasury, the increasing prominence of risk and 
complexity reflect the ability of individuals to utilise new markets and products to 
increase their consumption capacity, have more flexibility in the workplace, or engage 
in hitherto precluded speculative behaviour. Levels of risk and complexity therefore 
require treatment only to the extent that there is a mismatch – resulting from 
 64 
distortions to an otherwise efficient market – between the optimal preferences of 
individuals and the levels of risk and complexity actually borne. The Treasury’s 
treatment of risk and complexity reflects the ‘critical’ treatment of finance represented 
by Robert Shiller, as I outlined in chapter 1. 
The focus on the ‘risk preferences’ of households affords no scope for accounting for 
the structural shift of financial risk onto households (and attendant levels of 
complexity). Additionally, there is no account of the financial illiquidity of 
households, particularly those of the working class. These dimensions are not 
reducible solely to individual calculations of preferences, and therefore require 
different conceptual treatment to risk-exposed capital. 
I have structured this chapter to explore the limitations of the TWF when it comes to 
dealing with the costs of household risk, particularly as such costs manifest for 
working class households. In section 3.1, I explain the central role of the Treasury, 
and the factors that underpinned the 2004 release of the TWF.  I then explore the 
apparent chasm between the significance that risk and complexity are afforded within 
the TWF, and the neglect of such dimensions in the vast majority of the Treasury’s 
practical activities. In section 3.2, I relate such neglect to the Treasury’s “generalised 
utilitarian” (The Treasury, 2009[2004]: 6) conceptualisation of risk and complexity. 
In section 3.3, I outline the Treasury’s ensuing policy prescriptions. The stated 
purpose of these prescriptions is to account for and address the costs absorbed by an 
increasingly financialised household. Instead, I argue that they legitimise and 
reinforce the household as the site of absorption of these costs.  
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3.1 The TWF in Context: 
 
(i) Background 
The Treasury performs a critical function within the Australian Public Service, as the 
government department directly responsible for developing economic policy and 
preparing the Federal Budget. As stated in its mission statement, the Treasury is 
expected to base decisions according to the long-term wellbeing of all Australians: “to 
anticipate and analyse policy issues from a whole-of-economy perspective” (The 
Treasury, 2009[2004]: 6). Since its inception in 1901, the Treasury has developed 
conceptual methods by which recent trends in the economy can be assessed, and 
appropriate policy responses can be formulated. The 2004 TWF represents the latest 
of such methods. The framework identifies the five above outlined dimensions, 
including both exposure to risk and levels of complexity, found to be the most 
pertinent for wellbeing. 
The TWF was conceived to extend conceptions of wellbeing beyond that of GDP or 
consumption capacity, embodying a growing recognition within the mainstream of the 
limitations of relying solely on such indicators. As Treasury Secretary Martin 
Parkinson states, the TWF: “encourages a broad assessment of the costs and benefits 
of policy proposals” (2011: 77). The recognition of the need to consider factors 
beyond GDP is far from new, either within the global intellectual community or in 
government agencies such as the Treasury. The Treasury published an article as early 
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as 1973, in response to concerns about the environmental limits to growth,10 with the 
purpose of acknowledging that: “economic growth is not a comprehensive measure of 
changes in the welfare or wellbeing of the community” (The Treasury, 1973: 5).  
While, however, critiques of growth measures have an established history, the focus 
on developing more positive alternative measures is a more recent objective. The 
TWF draws extensively on Amartya Sen’s ‘capabilities framework’11 to develop its 
‘generalised utilitarian’ approach that: 
… incorporates a range of determinants for utility (beyond income and GDP), 
and also a range of constituents of utility (beyond just individual happiness) 
(The Treasury, 2009[2004]: 4).  
This recent drive for a more comprehensive range of indicators reflects a growing 
global concern around prominent issues such as environmental sustainability and 
global development. Critically, it also reflects a growing concern about the effects of 
household engagement with finance.  
These concerns surrounding household finance have increased since the TWF was 
released 8 years ago, particularly given the onset of the GFC. The IMF has 
acknowledged that the household has become the global financial system’s “shock 
absorber of last resort” (2005: 89). In 2008, the then French President Nicholas 
Sarkozy convened a global commission (the Commission on the Measurement of 
Economic Performance and Social Progress) led by notable economists Joseph 
Stiglitz, Amartya Sen and Jean-Paul Fitoussi. The commission addressed the 
discrepancy between aggregate data and perceptions on questions surrounding living 
standards: “a gap so large that it cannot be explained by reference to money illusion 
or human psychology” (Stiglitz et. al., 2009: 7). For Stiglitz et. al., a central element 
underpinning this discrepancy was increasing levels of economic insecurity resulting 
from “major changes in how households function” (2009: 14-15).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See for example Herman Daly, (1977) Steady-State Economics: The Economics of Biophysical 
Equilibrium and Moral Growth, W. H. Freeman, San Francisco. 
11 By capabilities, Sen is concerned with the actual freedom we have to promote or achieve the various 
combinations of functionings that we have reason to value (Sen, 1999: 74). See for example Amartya 
Sen, (1999) Development as Freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
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Since Stiglitz et. al. released their findings in 2009, the Treasury has repeatedly 
affirmed the findings’ importance and emphasised that such findings inform the 
Treasury’s conceptual approach to wellbeing. For example, in a Treasury report on 
living standards, Gruen et. al. stated the general understanding that: 
As the 2009 Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report argued… broader measures of 
resources and income are called for… [and that] measuring ‘full income’ must 
be a part of the research agenda (2011: 89).12  
Gruen et. al. also emphasized that this understanding informs the five dimensions – 
including risk and complexity – that are afforded prominence within the TWF (2011: 
82).   
(ii) TWF in practice 
The TWF’s inclusion of risk and complexity actually places the Australian Treasury a 
step ahead of many in the international policy community. For example, the 2006 
OECD report ‘Alternative Measures of Economic Wellbeing’, also focussed on the 
importance of extending the determinants and constituents of economic wellbeing 
beyond those of economic resources. The OECD gave considerable attention to the 
dimensions of leisure time, inequality, environmental factors and social indicators, yet 
neglected to consider the costs associated with financial risk (Boarini et. al., 2006).  
The prominence of risk and complexity within the TWF has not, however, translated 
into systematic treatment when it comes to the Treasury’s practical activities. Only 
three articles published in the Treasury’s journal Economic Roundup – the TWF itself 
and two subsequent explanatory articles (see Banerjee & Ewing, 2004; Sandlant, 
2011) – have afforded considered attention to the relationship between risk and 
complexity and wellbeing. In the rest of the Treasury’s extensive statements and 
publications on broader policy priorities, levels of risk and complexity receive 
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& Gorecki, 2010: 8; Gorecki et. al, 2011: 11.  
 
 68 
minimal mention. A paradigmatic example of this is found within Treasury Secretary 
Martin Parkinson’s article ‘Sustainable Wellbeing’ (2011). The first half of the article 
outlines the TWF, and argues its importance for “a broad assessment of the costs and 
benefits of policy proposals” (2011: 77). The second half of the article is dedicated to 
detailing challenges facing policy makers: emerging economies; technological 
development; demographic changes; and climate change (2011: 82). There is, 
however, no mention of the way in which dimensions such as risk and complexity 
actually relate to such challenges. A similar neglect characterises the annual articles 
released in Economic Roundup on the ‘Opportunities and Challenges facing the 
nation’ (2010b). For example, Ken Henry identifies an aging population as a key 
challenge facing the Australian community. He subsequently emphasises the 
importance of a policy framework that facilitates fiscal sustainability and economic 
flexibility to deal with such a challenge (2010b: 13), but fails to engage with the risks 
for households implied in the current provision of retirement income.  
Furthermore, since the TWF’s publication in 2004, numerous papers have been 
published in Economic Roundup with detailed assessments of both the ways in which 
factors beyond GDP or consumption capacity can be incorporated into calculations of 
living standards, and the importance of doing so. Environmental sustainability is often 
the pre-eminent example. The importance of accounting for the costs associated with 
increasing levels of risk and complexity, however, receives no mention. One example 
from 2006, just 2 years after the release of the framework, saw social indicators such 
as leisure time, income distribution both between and within households, self-
sufficiency and health, and subjective measures such as happiness, identified as 
important factors for policy consideration (Coombs, 2006: 19). Another example from 
2010 offered a detailed assessment of how to account for questions surrounding 
environmental sustainability (Henry, 2010a). Both articles quoted Stiglitz et. al. in 
affirming that “what we measure shapes what we collectively strive to pursue” (2006: 
14). However, both neglected to consider the importance of measuring risk or 
complexity, overlooking the implications of the structural shift towards 
financialisation.  
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The Treasury does acknowledge that a gap exists between the wellbeing framework 
and practical activity. In fact, at repeated points Treasury representatives rationalise 
the importance of such a gap, stating “the framework is a tool for guidance, developed 
with the intention to provide a broad assessment of the costs and benefits of all 
policies” (Kelly & Gorecki, 2010: 3). As such, the TWF is a “descriptive tool not an 
analytical framework” (The Treasury, 2009 [2004]: 4) and cannot be applied as a 
“simple policy checklist” (Parkinson, 2011: 77).  
This simple rationalisation however does not explain the particular neglect of risk and 
complexity, and why the costs and implications associated with risk and complexity – 
and not those relating to, for example, environmental sustainability – consistently fall 
off the analytical agenda. Identifying this particular neglect of risk and complexity is 
my focus in the following section. 
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3.2 The Treasury’s Conception: 
Finance as Individual Choice 
 
(i) Treasury’s conceptualisation of risk and complexity 
People have different preferences regarding risk, depending on factors such as 
their relative financial security, their aspirations for the future, or their desire 
for risk as a good in its own right (The Treasury, 2009 [2004]: 11).  
The Treasury’s inclusion of risk and complexity does signify a recognition that 
individuals participate in risky financial transactions. This inclusion has not, however, 
translated into an adequate account of the pervasive ‘wellbeing’ costs associated with 
increasing levels of risk, nor the repercussions of such costs for households, 
particularly working class households. This results from an approach “grounded in 
welfare economics and utilitarianism” (The Treasury, 2009 [2004]: 11). This 
approach conceives of financial activity in terms of individual preferences, and is 
predicated on the existence (or potential existence) of efficient markets to facilitate 
such preferences.   
Following the analytical approaches of economists such as Shiller, the Treasury’s 
treatment of risk and complexity is based on applying the orthodox understanding of 
the risk intrinsic in every investment decision to the financially exposed household. 
The prominence of risk and complexity is thus conceived in terms of new 
opportunities afforded for individuals to realise their preferences. In discussing the 
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relationship between optimal risk allocation and expanded opportunities and 
freedoms, the Treasury states that “Risk trading enables greater choice with regard to 
risk borne, and provides opportunities for entrepreneurial activity” (The Treasury, 
2009 (2004): 15).  
Within this discourse, the Treasury frames instances where financialisation impacts 
negatively on households as market failures. The Treasury’s solution to these market 
failures is to build new market processes and train market participants. There is no 
actual measure of the deleterious consequences of risk (and complexity), even in 
terms of efficiency losses.  Risk and complexity are therefore conceived to negatively 
affect wellbeing, and thus become considerations for government policy only to the 
extent that market distortions prevent individuals from realising their preferred levels 
of risk and complexity (The Treasury, 2009 [2004]: 11).  
The Treasury identifies three sources of market distortions: (i) sub-optimal market 
structure and information; (ii) irrational market actors; and, (iii) particularly excessive 
products. Firstly, the Treasury identifies the existence of incomplete risk markets 
resulting from “failures of information, contractual problems and externalities” 
(Banerjee & Ewing, 2004: 26). This reasoning is consistent with the ‘Shiller’ 
conceptualisation of finance that asserts that ordinary people’s lack of access to 
financial markets, devices and services “must be overcome if society is truly to 
democratise finance” (Shiller, 2003: 13). Secondly, the Treasury identifies distortions 
resulting from individual irrationality, where “people’s expected utility functions may 
not necessarily be well-ordered” (Banerjee & Ewing, 2004: 29). This concern (also 
consistent with the perspective of Shiller) is informed by behavioural economics, and 
specifically by the work of Nicholas Barbaris and Richard Thaler who state that: 
Some features of asset prices are most plausibly interpreted as deviations from 
fundamental value, and that these deviations are brought about by traders who 
are not fully rational (2002: 2; see also Shleifer, 2000: 24).  
Such psychological biases and quirks undermine the assumption that there exists a 
knowable fundamental value that is recognisable to all participants and facilitates 
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optimal resource allocation (The Treasury, 2009[2004]: 11). The third reason is 
identified by the Treasury’s Corporations and Financial Services Division manager 
Richard Sandlant in his post subprime-mortgage article ‘Consumer Financial 
Protection’: namely, the emergence of “excessively complex and risky products” 
(2012: 38). That is, that the difficulties involved in managing particularly volatile 
products are beyond the capabilities of even the most financially responsible of 
investors.  
The Treasury therefore identifies that sub-optimal markets, behavioural irrationalities, 
or excessively volatile products, may result in levels of risk and complexity that do 
not match individual preferences. In such circumstances, certain policies may be 
justified to facilitate the realisation of optimal preferences and improve wellbeing. 
These policies include: the development of more efficient or missing risk markets to 
facilitate trading in human capital (Banerjee and Ewing, 2004: 31); educational 
policies to address “issues of context, paths and perceptions” (2004: 42); and, 
regulation against particularly volatile products (Sandlant, 2012: 38). For example, 
the Treasury advocates the “simple, low cost default superannuation product” 
MySuper to offer individuals lower levels of exposure to risk and complexity in their 
retirement investments (Sandlant, 2011: 39). Such policies allow households, like 
capital, to better manage their risk exposure, signifying the implicit acceptance by the 
Treasury that households can be conceived of as akin to capital. I outline such policy 
implications in section 3.3.  
(ii) Finance – the neglected cost 
The Treasury’s treatment of risk and complexity may have incorporated household 
consumption into the discourse of financial calculation in a way that the CPI has not, 
and even identified particular difficulties, such as the asymmetric ability of 
individuals to trade particular resources, or to deal with the risks of excessively 
volatile products. However, this treatment has not translated into a comprehensive 
account of the implications of such financial activity for household wellbeing. Neither 
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has it translated into an account of the particular risks absorbed by working class 
households.  
In chapter 1, I identified that over the past 40 years a significant transfer of risks and 
complexity has occurred from the state and corporate sector onto households. 
Processes of deregulation and privatisation have resulted in a significant decline in the 
public provisioning of important household items, while simultaneously facilitating 
the development of financial markets as alternative methods of provision. These 
changing patterns of household expenditure have been reinforced by simultaneous 
changes in the labour market, where job security, consistency of available work, level 
of income, and employment conditions, have all become increasingly precarious. 
Recognition of such transformations underpinned the recommendations of the 
aforementioned report by Stiglitz et. al., and its explicit recognition that households 
face new costs that reflect changes beyond that of the individual: 
There have been major changes in how households and society function. For 
example, many of the services people received from other family members in 
the past are now purchased on the market. This shift translates into a rise in 
income as measured in the national accounts and may give a false impression 
of a change in living standards, while it merely reflects a shift from non-
market to market provision of services (2006: 14).  
The report subsequently underscores the need for a ‘household perspective’ in 
measuring wellbeing that accounts for (among many other factors) the “growing 
insecurity” facing households, and also factors such as the declining social benefits 
coming from the government, interest payments on household loans, and household 
liabilities (2006: 13). Stiglitz et. al. do not, perhaps, afford the financialised household 
the prominence it has received in my thesis, but they nevertheless recognise that 
‘major changes’ have occurred beyond that of individual preferences, whether or not 
affected by sub-optimal market conditions. These major changes have entailed a 
significant cost for households that their counterparts of 40 years ago did not have to 
negotiate.  
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These changes are particularly significant for working class households. As I outlined 
in chapter 1, this is because working class households hold illiquid assets and have a 
limited access to financial markets.  
Financialisation is therefore characterised by a structural and unequal shift of the 
risks (and complexities) involved in accessing household subsistence items and an 
income. The nature of household risk requires different conceptualisation and 
treatment to the risk-exposed firm or government, in that the risks and complexity 
absorbed by households cannot be accounted for purely in terms of individual risk 
return calculi. This difference is particularly the case for the ‘illiquid’ working class 
household. The Treasury’s abstraction of individual preferences affords no scope for 
considering the costs signified by such structurally increasing levels of risk and 
complexity. Furthermore, the orthodox models underpinning the TWF are based on a 
direct denial of innate financial illiquidity, for they assume that individuals are able to 
manage and hedge against increasing levels of risk and complexity, whereby 
“diversification is essential for all investing” (Bernstein, 2007: 9).  
The failure to engage with structurally increasing levels of risk and complexity raises 
critical questions about the capacity of the Treasury’s individualist discourse to 
explain economic processes, and also raises critical questions for the ‘never had it so 
good’ narrative that the Treasury assumes when engaging in its important political 
activities.  
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3.3 The Treasury’s Treatment of Risk: 
A Restricted Policy Framework 
 
The Treasury’s practical engagement with risk and complexity is confined to 
particular and isolated areas: namely, those areas in which the previously outlined 
‘distortions’ prevent individuals from realising their optimal risk or complexity 
preferences. The Treasury’s policy program is therefore based on identifying and 
evaluating specific inefficiencies, with particular focus on locating instances of 
irrationality and developing strategies to make market participants more rational.  
An example of such a policy program is concretely outlined by Richard Sandlant, who 
identifies four pillars to address ‘sub-optimal’ levels of risk and complexity: (i) 
financial literacy; (ii) financial advice from accessible and impartial sources; (iii) 
financial product disclosure; and (iv) financial product regulation (2012: 37). The 
stated goal of these four pillars is to improve wellbeing through the provision of 
financial protection. Consumers are empowered to engage with risk and complexity 
on a more equal playing field, and utilise markets to their advantage (2012: 35). These 
strategies, however, assume that once such pillars are in place, ‘rational’ individuals 
will have all the skills and tools needed to negotiate increasing levels of risk and 
complexity. Therefore, while these pillars in part fall into the policy domain of 
consumer protection, they are also conceived in encouraging households to be active 
and informed risk traders, akin to the model of rational actors as developed by Shiller. 
This conception affords no space for considering the actual consequences and 
wellbeing costs of increasing levels of risk or complexity. Instead, such treatment 
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legitimises and reinforces households as responsible for such increasing levels, further 
cementing the household as ‘shock absorber of last resort’.  
For example, in dealing with income insecurity, the Treasury supports the 
development of markets for income insurance, which individuals can use to realise 
their optimal risk preferences (Banerjee & Ewing, 2004: 31). The development of 
such insurance markets is seen to overcome the asymmetries resulting from the 
difficulties of trading in human capital, particularly if this happens alongside 
education that supports consumers so that they “can understand the key risks before 
making a decision to invest” (Sandlant, 2012: 37). The negative impact that increasing 
levels of income insecurity and volatility may be having on wellbeing is not a 
consideration.  
Furthermore, and ironically, this kind of ‘investment’ expenditure in insurance 
markets is deemed desirable by the Treasury in the name of living standards, but is at 
the same time explicitly precluded as relevant to household inflation within the CPI.  
In this section, I have outlined a critical inconsistency of the TWF. We can see that 
rather than developing ways to account for and address the pervasiveness of risk and 
complexity of daily life, the Treasury’s pillars of protection instead legitimise such 
pervasiveness. Further, there is no accounting for the particular difficulties that risk 
exposure poses for ‘illiquid’ working class households. 
HECS: an illustration 
The Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) is a paradigmatic example of the 
ways in which a policy, advocated by the Treasury to address adverse risk and 
complexity and offer protection, acts to legitimise the transfer of financial risk.  
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The Treasury conceives of education as an investment in human capital, whereby 
individuals decide to invest so as to increase their potential future access to higher 
incomes. However, the Treasury also acknowledges that, lacking collateral, 
individuals are unable to either access or guarantee such future earnings, or even 
guarantee that they will finish a degree. These difficulties create significant barriers 
for investment: “Education is an investment that can sometimes fail, with the 
possibility of significant costs for little or no gain” (Banerjee & Ewing, 2004: 41). In 
addition, it is often the case that individuals (students) making investment decisions 
lack even the collateral needed to secure the loan. The Treasury thus identifies “the 
unsecured nature of loans for education” (2004: 40). Such insecurity both dissuades 
financial providers from supplying the needed collateral, and also, where providers do 
decide to supply such collateral, the insecurity makes them likely to charge a higher 
premium. These difficulties faced in investing in education reflect the difficulties 
posed by an inability to trade in human capital, which limit the capacity of individuals 
to utilise credit and other financial markets to their advantage (2004: 40).  
In response to these difficulties, the Treasury advocates government supported HECS 
to facilitate both the smooth functioning of existing markets, and also the 
development of absent risk markets. This is because HECS is able to overcome the 
contractual and informational risk constraints otherwise faced in private provision. 
HECS does this by securing a contract over the whole of a working-life, making the 
loan much less vulnerable to short-term evasion; and also by pooling the risk, 
minimising the impact of individual failure to finish a degree or secure a higher 
income (2004: 40-41). Furthermore, given the premiums and contractual agreements 
that students would have to otherwise enter into in the accessing of private loans, 
HECS “substantially reduces the risk levels faced by individuals choosing to enter the 
higher education system” (2004: 41). HECS thus represents a policy that allows 
students to realise their ‘optimal preferences’, through the government facilitation of 
incomplete markets for risk.  
The Treasury’s appraisal of HECS through such a paradigm, affords no scope for 
considering the increasing levels of risk and complexity that students now face as a 
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result of changes in public provisioning. These changes have structurally shifted the 
exposure involved in accessing education onto students, regardless of individual 
preferences.  Equally, and even if the Treasury outlines the difficulties of trading in 
human capital, there is no scope for accounting for the particular effect that such 
changes have had on students from working class households. In view of their 
illiquidity, these households generally have little option whether to participate in the 
HECS scheme in comparison to those with an expanded asset portfolio who may be 
able to pay the up-front fees. Furthermore, under the Australian Bankruptcy Act 1966, 
HECS is not provable in bankruptcy and may thus be recovered after bankruptcy 
(Australian Taxation Office, 2012). This particular feature of HECS further restricts 
the ability of those with a HECS debt to operate akin to risk-exposed capital.   
The Treasury’s approach to HECS demonstrates that, even in the isolated areas where 
risk and complexity are treated as important factors for policy development, the 
Treasury’s discourse of individual preferences precludes a consideration of the costs 
associated with broader societal changes. Instead, the translating policy prescriptions 
act to reinforce individuals as financial players. At the same time, we can see that in 
casting such educational costs as investment, the drain of such expenditure on 
standard of living (via fees and loan repayments), remains systematically excluded 
from measures such as the CPI. 
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3.4 Conclusion: 
 
In including exposure to risk and complexity as two of the five determinants of 
wellbeing, the TWF does to a degree remedy the neglect of financialised daily life that 
characterises the CPI. Like Shiller and Stiglitz, the Treasury has brought the 
household into the discourse of financial calculation.  
The recognition that financialised life exists has not, however, translated into a 
treatment of risk and complexity that accounts for the pervasive, uneven and often 
concealed ways that risky financial activity has infiltrated daily life.  Equally there is 
not any account of differential effects of risky financial activity, particularly as it 
manifests for the illiquid working class household. This limited account results from 
the Treasury’s conceptualisation of household finance in terms of individual 
preferences, and the assumption of the existence – or at least potential existence – of 
liquid risk markets that facilitate the realisation of such preferences. Levels of risk and 
complexity are thus indicative of the expanded opportunities offered to individuals 
through new avenues of participation, with the exception of areas where particular 
distortions have undermined the realisation of optimal risk preferences.  
A narrative of particular distortions means that the Treasury is only able to frame the 
some of the problems associated with financial risk, and not actually account for 
increasingly pervasive risk when it comes to questions of measurement. The Treasury 
therefore advocates policies (such as HECS) that focus on facilitating people’s 
‘rational’ management of their risk exposure, through the development of missing 
markets, programs of financial literacy, and certain product regulation. Such policies 
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reinforce individuals as financial actors, capable of negotiating complex financial 
markets and risk exposures. In this context, it can be seen that the TWF actually 
moves from being a measure of wellbeing, to a ‘cost of disutility abatement’ 
framework. In so doing, the framework acts to legitimise and reinforce households as 
the absorbers of the costs associated with financial risk.  
The Treasury is far from isolated in letting considerations of systemic risk and 
complexity fall off the analytical agenda. However, the Treasury’s practical treatment 
of household finance is particularly significant given the important function that it 
plays in the Australian political landscape. It means that the Australian institution 
charged with maximising the wellbeing of the Australian household, and utilising 
considerations of wellbeing to inform government policy, neglects to account for the 
significant consequences of the financialisation of working class daily life. This fact 
has even greater importance given the Treasury’s repeated assumptions that living 
standards continue to progressively increase, on the basis that GDP is increasing, and 
that other social and subjective measures are positively correlated to GDP (Coombs, 
2006: 19). We can see, however, through the analysis that I have outlined in this 
chapter, that its explicit support of the ‘never had it so good’ narrative of the 
Australian household is based on methodologically weak assumptions, and a failure to 
grapple with the structural character of financialisation.  
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§ CONCLUSION § 
 
Over the past generation, an economic transformation has taken place […] the 
once-secure family that could count on hard work and fair play to keep it safe 
has been transformed by current economic risk and realities. Now a pink slip, 
a bad diagnosis, or a disappearing spouse can catapult a family to newly poor 
in a few months (Warren, 2006).  
The past 40 years has been characterised by a structural transfer of financial risk. The 
Australian household has had little option but to absorb the increasingly pervasive 
risks associated with accessing both subsistence goods and services, and an income. 
Such pervasive risks have significant implications for household standard of living, as 
indicated above by Elizabeth Warren (who headed Consumer Protection inside the US 
Federal Reserve after implementing the post-GFC Troubled Asset Relief Program). I 
have identified how these pervasive risks are particularly the case for the ‘illiquid’ 
working class household, whose lack of tradeable assets leave them few, if any, low-
risk options in their increasingly financialised lives. 
However, an account of the implications of financialised daily life, and in particular a 
quantification of the costs associated with pervasive risk, continues to fall off the 
analytical agenda. This neglect of household risks is anomalous to the treatment of 
risk-exposed capital. In relation to capital, convention dictates that: “a good financial 
system manages risk in ways that enable higher risk activities to be undertaken for 
higher return” (Stiglitz, 2009). In contrast, conventional accounts of living standards 
in Australia – as represented by the Consumer Price Index and the Treasury 
Wellbeing Framework – neglect to quantify the costs of household risk.  
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It is this general neglect, which has been both theoretical and empirical, that I’ve 
identified as a critical factor in the apparent paradox between the conventional ‘never 
had it so good’ narrative, and household concerns surrounding living costs in 
Australia. 
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The Neglect of Risk: 
 
A Technical Problem? 
 
 
In many ways, I have framed the issues relating to the neglect of household risk as 
technical problems. I have examined the ‘pre-financialised’ conceptions or methods 
of classification, which have prevented the ABS and Treasury from adequately 
engaging and quantifying the consequences of risk-exposed daily life. 
For example, for the CPI to offer an adequate account of the financialised household’s 
cost of living, it must necessarily break down the conceptual distinction between 
stable consumption and risky investment expenditure, and apply some form of risk 
return calculus to households. However, in order to measure household, and not 
capital, inflation, the CPI must necessarily conceive of households as occupying a 
separate sphere to capital, and thus to risk-exposed financial activities. This 
methodological conundrum signifies further critical questions: what should inflation 
actually measure; what does inflation actually mean; and is the CPI correct in 
differentiating – and prioritising – a measure of household inflation from a measure of 
household cost of living? 
As indicated by these broader questions, such ‘technical’ conundrums are far from 
limited to the CPI. Indeed, a similar tendency to conceive of household expenditure 
costs as separate to risk-exposed capital investment characterises the critical literature 
on neoliberalism that sets the backdrop for this thesis. This is despite the fact that 
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household engagement in such risky ‘capitalist’ activities underpins many of the 
neoliberal changes such literature depicts. 
However, and significantly, the neglect of the CPI to account for household risk is not 
solely technical or analytical, and is inseparable from both the CPI’s political function 
and the political implications of accounting for household finance. Indeed, 
overcoming such limitations and finding ways to quantify household risk is precisely 
the tasks being undertaken in the reports commissioned by financial institutions 
Fujitsu and Genworth. As a leading provider of mortgage insurance, Genworth 
employs RFi Intelligence to:  
... provide strategic research, market intelligence and advisory services… [in 
order to] identify customer needs and preferences, opportunities and threats in 
the competitive landscape (RFi, 2012).  
Thus, in instances where institutions have an agenda of observing households as if 
they operate akin to capital, we can see such institutions finding ways of overcoming 
the technical barriers to calculating household risk.  
It has therefore been important to examine the agenda underpinning the CPI’s ‘pre-
financialised’ technical difficulties. The CPI’s purpose is to inform RBA monetary 
policy. The CPI must therefore, as explicitly stated by both the ABS and RBA, 
exclude interest rates, given that interest rates reflect changes in the RBA cash rate. 
Moreover, the incorporation of any financial activity poses political difficulties for the 
CPI, given that the RBA uses the CPI to set the interest rate to meet a medium term 
inflation-target, and in so doing regulates the income of households. To incorporate 
financial activities into the CPI would mean that, to some degree, the RBA would 
begin to regulate the income of capital. Within conventional political discourse, 
profits rates are not in any way conceived of as a rate to be regulated like that of 
consumer prices, and are emphatically separated from such oversight. These issues 
exemplify that the breaking down of the technical limitations of the CPI has 
significant implications far beyond particular adjustments to the measure. 
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The political implications behind such analytical or technical issues become even 
more apparent when considering the TWF, and its explicit attempt to incorporate 
levels of risk and complexity into conceptions of wellbeing. The TWF does extend its 
conceptual understanding and treatment of risk to the financialised household, 
developing a policy program of financial literacy to overcome the barriers to efficient 
and rational risk trading. In this sense, the Treasury’s specific engagement with 
household risk is actually at odds with, and represents a conceptual improvement on, 
the CPI’s systematic exclusion of the costs of household risk.  
At the same time, however, the Treasury is unable to treat pervasive risk as signifying 
a cost borne by households, and thus as a critical factor when measuring wellbeing or 
formulating policy frameworks. This is because to do so would require engaging with 
the structural shifting of risk, and the particular costs this has resulted in for the 
illiquid working class household. Such engagement with systemic risk would shatter 
the Treasury’s whole conceptual paradigm of an economy dictated by individual 
preferences and efficient markets. The TWF therefore sidesteps such structural 
concerns. In so doing, it shifts from a measure of wellbeing to a cost of disutility 
abatement framework, and advocates policies that embed households in their role as 
financial actors.  
Therefore, although I have framed many of the issues posed by risk as technical, the 
CPI’s and the TWF’s differing (and even inconsistent) treatment of household risk, 
exemplify that the politics of such issues are critical. This political significance is not 
solely due to the CPI’s and the TWF’s functional significance in the Australian 
political landscape. Rather, we can see how the treatment of risk by the Treasury 
legitimises and reinforces households in their role as financial investors – as the 
‘shock absorber of last resort’. Indeed, the TWF justifies such activity in the name of 
improving wellbeing. At the same time, the treatment afforded by the CPI to 
household risk, systematically denies the relevance of risk-exposed investment for 
households when measuring household inflation.  
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A consideration of this dual process – whereby households are systematically 
integrated into financial activities, but in a way that denies the implications of these 
activities for living standards – will be critical in developing and formulating a 
practical response to financialisation. While I have not explicitly advocated such a 
response in this thesis, it is certainly implied and supported in many of my findings. 
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The Shifting of Risk: 
 
A Class Phenomenon? 
 
 
In this thesis I have examined financialisation through the lens of class, focussing on 
the specific and significant impact that pervasive risk has had on the ‘illiquid’ 
working class household. This perspective has allowed me to explore the systemic and 
unequal nature of financial changes, and the particular costs that such changes have 
signified for working class households.  
Bringing the costs of working class risk to the fore is particularly important, given that 
the mainstream narrative only reinforces risk-shifting processes in its recasting of all 
households as financial players. Households are assumed to be capable of managing 
and absorbing the increasing levels of risk-exposure, costs and complexity. Increasing 
resources are being poured into schemes of financial literacy or education, to afford 
people the ‘skills’ needed to responsibly manage an increasing array of financial 
assets. For example, in 2011, the national financial regulator the Australian Securities 
and Investment Commission (ASIC) released the National financial literacy strategy 
report, followed up with the launch of the ‘MoneySmart’ website, with the purpose of 
supporting households in “understanding money and finances and being able to 
confidently apply that knowledge to make effective decisions” (ASIC, 2011: 4).13 At 
the same time, as early as year 9 or 10, commerce and economics classes in the NSW 
school syllabus cover ‘the skills needed’ in weighing up different car, properties, 
insurance plans etc. Indeed, it is amidst such a backdrop that the Treasury’s policy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The report resulted in the launch of the ‘MoneySmart’ website that provides advice on a whole 
variety of financial areas such as managing money, credit cards, avoiding scams, superannuation and 
car loans, in order to afford people “the tips and the tools to help you make the most of your money” 
(ASIC, 2012: 4). 
	   88 
response to increasing levels of financial risk is to facilitate the development of new 
risk markets and programs of financial literacy. Across society, households are 
increasingly presumed to be risk savvy and responsible financial actors, who balance 
different options, engage in long-term planning, and absorb calculated levels of risk. 
Such savvy and responsible financial activity, however, relies on having control or 
ownership over liquid and tradable assets. Yet it is precisely an absence of such assets 
that I have identified as defining working class households. With such little agency, 
and a restricted ability to hedge or diversify, the ‘risk preference’ of a working class 
household to purchase the credit and invest in the insurance products required in 
securing a home loan, is incomparable to the risk preference of a firm to invest in a 
particular hedge fund, or even the preferences of households with significant wealth 
holdings. 
This restricted ability of working class households has significant consequences, 
particularly in periods of financial turbulence. The items that such households expose 
to the volatility and risks of financial markets consist of retirement income, housing, 
healthcare, education, telephone or utilities as well as current income levels. When the 
liabilities of households are affected by the volatility and instability that characterises 
financial activity, households therefore risk losing access to the basic necessities of 
daily life. This vulnerability was reflected in the drop in superannuation fund returns 
during the GFC, and it was also reflected in the devastating effects of the subprime 
mortgage crisis on many poor and working class households in America. 
Exploring financialisation through the lens of class has therefore allowed me to 
challenge the orthodox narrative of individual preferences facilitated through efficient 
and liquid financial markets. This challenge is critical because such a narrative of risk 
savvy individuals allows for the continued neglect of the quantification of the 
wellbeing costs of financial risk.  
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At the same time, however, many of the processes associated with financialisation are 
certainly not class specific. For instance, there exists a significant disparity between 
different working class households in terms of their ability to manage such increasing 
risk-exposure. For example, the 17% of Australian households without access to a 
computer, or the 21% without access to Internet, the majority of which are lower 
income and/or elderly (ABS, 2011d), are exceptionally disadvantaged in their ability 
to perform such a financialised role. The class-based analysis I have adopted should 
therefore be conceived as opening up further questions on the unequal nature of 
financial changes according to other analytical categories such as income distribution, 
gender, age, household type etc. 
Furthermore, financial risk has affected all households. That is, such risk shifting has 
also entailed significant costs for non-working class households regardless of their 
ownership or control over assets. This consideration raises further questions 
surrounding conceptions of households and class in a financialised world, and thus of 
the role of all households when putting forward alternative political agendas. 
These questions are beyond the scope of this thesis. Here, I have rather used the lens 
of class to identify and explore a critical problem: namely, the absence of the 
quantification of the costs of financial risk in the mainstream ways in which living 
standards are conceived, measured and addressed in Australia. Until the risk-exposed 
working class household is reconceptualised, the prevailing political narratives will 
continue to conceive of the household as a financially literate risk trader, while 
neglecting to quantify the impact of risk for households. A synthesis will continue 
where policy frameworks such as the TWF cast households as capital, while cost of 
living measures such as the CPI emphatically treat households as separate from 
capital activities.  
The costs of financial exposure absorbed by the ‘never had it so good’ Australian 
household will remain concealed.  
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